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INTRODUCTION 
The purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties is a significant 
part of an oil and gas practice in Louisiana.1 The term “producing oil and 
gas properties” encompasses not only the principal asset (the mineral lease) 
but also the equipment and wells that have been drilled pursuant to the 
mineral lease, as well as the panoply of agreements, licenses, permits, and 
other contractual rights assembled by the selling party in connection with 
the development and exploitation of the mineral lease. For a variety of 
reasons, a party who owns producing mineral leases might elect to divest 
itself of those interests.  
The reasons leading a leasehold owner to a decision to divest might 
range from a desire to be relieved of future liabilities, or at least to pass 
along such obligations to another, to “quit” the business, or to commit 
capital to other ventures or enterprises. Additionally, in the current 
environment of depressed prices for oil and gas, many exploration and 
production (“E&P”) companies operating under a commercial line of 
credit are facing the certainty of a redetermination of their borrowing base 
                                                                                                             
 1. Having practiced oil and gas law since the Spring of 1974, this Author 
has been involved in innumerable transactions of the type discussed here, 
involving the purchase and sale of producing properties in several states, totaling 
per transaction purchase prices ranging from smaller amounts to many millions 
of dollars. The total of all such transactions would be in the billions of dollars in 
the aggregate. 
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by their lender.2 In turn, this fact makes prudent an examination of 
properties, which are not deemed to be “core,” to reduce secured debt by 
selling such properties and paying down debt. Regardless of the reason for 
divesting itself of the interest, producing oil and gas properties will still 
have significant value, especially to those who are able to put them to a 
more profitable use.  
Although a major oil and gas—or even a large independent—company 
might deem a producing property to no longer be profitable according to 
its own internal financial yield or performance requirements, a smaller 
independent company can often find significant value in the same suite of 
assets. The smaller company may believe that it can operate the field more 
efficiently or economically by lowering the per-barrel “lifting costs,”3 or 
other expenses of operation, at least in comparison to the seller. This 
marginal cost reduction is sometimes called “working the margins.”  
Typically, the sale—and concomitant purchase—of producing oil and 
gas properties entails several distinct phases: the announcement by the 
seller of an intent to divest and consequential solicitation of potential 
bidders; the preliminary evaluation of the assets being offered for sale; the 
arrangement of preliminary terms, perhaps to be embodied in a “letter of 
intent”; the negotiation and execution of a formal purchase and sale 
agreement; the performance of “due diligence” on the part of the 
purchaser; the closing of the transaction; and post-closing adjustments. 
These necessary actions do not happen overnight, and each phase comes 
with its own legal complications. 
Several excellent papers have been delivered at the Louisiana Institute 
on Mineral Law on this general topic, as well as on distinct aspects of the 
transaction.4 At the Institute on Oil and Gas Law, which The Institute for 
                                                                                                             
 2. “The borrowing base for O&G loans is the estimated value of O&G that 
can be produced from the mineral rights. It is determined by analyzing prior 
production reports and independent engineering valuations.” OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION LENDING 17, 56 
(2014), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type 
/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-a-og.pdf. It is a “collateral base agreed to by the 
borrower and lender that is used to limit the amount of funds the lender advances 
the borrower. Id. The borrowing base specifies the maximum amount that can be 
borrowed in terms of collateral type, eligibility, and advance rates.” Id. Typically, 
but not universally, the amount of the loan would be based upon 80% of the value 
of the borrower’s assets, supported by reserve reports, title opinions, etc. Id. 
 3. This term has reference to those costs incurred by the operator, and which 
are “necessary to lift the oil from the ground.” Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 
604 P.2d 854, 857 n.8 (Okla. 1979). 
 4. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bateman, Jr., Representing Sellers and Buyers in the 
Sale of Producing Properties: Fundamentals of the Acquisition Process, 34 ANN. 
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Energy Law of The Center for American and International Law sponsors, 
other fine journals have made other informative presentations.5 Recent 
developments, principally the spate of sales necessitated by the volatile 
price of oil and gas and the concomitant pressure on companies to reduce 
debt, suggest that now might be an appropriate time to take a more 
contemporary look at the issues that might arise in the Bayou State. 
A sufficient presentation on this topic could be accomplished by 
merely reviewing and discussing the various terms and provisions 
commonly contained in the customary purchase and sale agreement 
(“PSA”),6 without looking “under the hood.” An understanding of the 
legal principles that embrace or support the salient clauses in the PSA, 
however, is necessary to gain an insight into the import of those 
provisions, as well as the legal requirements, if any, that are necessary in 
respect of any particular contractual stipulation.  
Fortunately, in many transactions, the “deal is closed” without the 
need to give any significant consideration to these important matters. In 
the unfortunate instance when the parties are not able to “close the deal,” 
the occasion arises to resort to the law books to evaluate the respective 
rights and obligations of the parties. A great deal can be said for knowing 
                                                                                                             
INST. ON MIN. L. 163 (1987); Paul A. Strickland, Merchantable Title and the 
Mineral Lease, 40 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 236 (1993); Robert L. Cabes, Rights 
and Obligations of Third Parties in the Acquisition of Oil and Gas Properties, 40 
ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 249 (1993); Don Sinex, Seller’s Duty to Disclose to Buyer, 
47 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 197 (2000); Anthony C. Marino, Current Developments 
in Producing Property Acquisitions: The Role of the Title Examiner in Acquisitions 
& Frequently Encountered Lease Form Provisions, 59 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 25 
(2012). 
 5. See, e.g., Harry C. Weeks, Advantageous Methods of Handling the 
Purchase of Oil and Gas Properties, 3 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 387 
(1952); Manro T. Oberwetter, The Sale and Purchasing of Producing Properties, 
9 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 403 (1963); Jack E. Earnest, Sale and Purchase of 
Oil and Gas Properties, 16 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 189 (1965); Phillip 
R. Clark, Producing Property Acquisitions: Legal and Practical Considerations, 
37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 9-1 (1986); James L. Irish, Structuring 
Acquisitions of Oil and Gas Properties: Significant Considerations in Deciding 
Whether to Purchase a Company or to Purchase Its Assets, 40 INST. ON OIL & 
GAS L. & TAX’N 2-1 (1989); Richard C. Rice, Sales Agreements for the 
Disposition of Oil and Gas Properties: A Seller’s Perspective, 46 INST. ON OIL & 
GAS L. & TAX’N 5 (1995); David Patton, Purchasing Onshore Oil and Gas Assets 
(The Buyer’s Perspective), 59 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. 12 (2008). 
 6. In the jargon of the industry, and frequently herein, the purchase and sale 
agreement is commonly called simply the “PSA.” 
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the fundamental, relevant rules before the deal goes south in the Bayou 
State. 
This Article presents a broad overview of the most important rules and 
legal issues surrounding the purchase and sale of producing properties in 
Louisiana. Part I considers the fundamentals of the purchase and sale of 
producing properties, including the nature of producing properties and the 
factors that motivate a party to sell its producing mineral leases. As the 
Article examines this topic in the Bayou State, attention is given to the 
sources of laws. Part II examines pertinent provisions of the Louisiana 
Mineral Code as they relate to the assignment of mineral leases. Part III 
expands the examination of applicable law to include the relevant 
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, particularly the nominate contract 
of sale. As the purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties is to 
be evidenced by a written agreement, Part IV takes up the contractual 
provisions typically encountered in purchase and sale agreements. This 
Part also explains in detail the steps taken in anticipation of a closing. 
Finally, the Article considers the range of remedies available to the parties 
in the regrettable circumstance that a transaction is not consummated as 
contemplated by the PSA. 
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE SALE OF PRODUCING OIL 
AND GAS PROPERTIES 
To understand the nuances of a PSA involving producing oil and gas 
properties in Louisiana, one must first have a firm grasp on the legal 
foundations underlying such agreements. This task is challenging, because 
a complex network of statutes, regulations, and jurisprudential rules 
govern mineral interests in the Bayou State. For this reason, this Part will 
discuss the nature of producing oil and gas properties as well as the sale of 
such properties in practice.  
A. The Nature of Producing Oil and Gas Properties 
Fundamentally, the sale of producing oil and gas properties is the sale 
of immovable property,7 at least so far as the principal asset is concerned. 
The principal asset is the mineral lease because without that vital 
agreement, the right to be on the property of another—and to produce oil 
and gas from that property—generally does not exist.8  
                                                                                                             
 7. “A mineral [lease] is an incorporeal immovable. It is alienable and 
heritable.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:18 (2000); see also id. § 31:16. 
 8. Id. § 31:114 (“A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted 
the right to explore for and produce minerals.”). But see id. § 31:21 (“A mineral 
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Certainly other important rights and interests are involved and 
necessarily transferred, and such rights and interests are not always subject 
to the laws pertaining to the alienation of immovable property.9 As 
important and as critical as such interests are for the prudent operation of the 
producing field, however, they intrinsically follow or trail the disposition of 
the principal asset—the mineral lease. Without the ownership of the mineral 
lease, the ancillary rights or interests, standing alone, are relatively 
inconsequential and certainly are not sufficient to confer upon the purchaser 
the right to operate on the land and to produce hydrocarbons.10 
B. Sales Involving Producing Oil and Gas Properties in Practice 
The sale of producing oil and gas properties is essentially contractual: 
most “deals” live or die with the PSA. The PSA is the “sophisticated” 
contract, which undertakes to anticipate and cover all contingencies that 
might potentially arise between the seller and the purchaser.  
Both in practice and in law, there is rarely a need to “go to the law 
books,” that is, to evaluate the reason why a particular action is done or 
not done in a strict legal sense. Even so, having a basic understanding of 
why “this works” or “that does not work” in the negotiation or execution 
of a PSA or in its administration is still important. 
With this observation, giving consideration to the fundamental 
“ground rules” that might come into play in connection with the sale of 
producing oil and gas properties is appropriate. The proper starting point 
is the statutory or codal law of Louisiana.11  
C. The “Hierarchy of Pertinent Law”12 
Heaven forbid that a dispute should arise and that the transaction is 
not perfectly consummated as contemplated by the PSA. The seller can 
blame the purchaser, and certainly vice versa, but the dispute exists. In a 
PSA, which is governed by Louisiana law, the “ground rules” are provided 
                                                                                                             
servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of 
exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and 
ownership.”). 
 9. Examples of these “other important rights” would include servitude 
agreements (sometimes called “rights-of-way”) and other contracts in support of 
operations or production. 
 10. See supra note 8. 
 11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2015) (“The sources of law are legislation and 
custom.”). 
 12. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of PATRICK S. OTTINGER, 
LOUISIANA MINERAL LEASES — A TREATISE ch. 3, pt. I (forthcoming 2016). 
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by applicable law. What are the “ground rules” to evaluate the position of 
each party? 
As in any dispute, an established “hierarchy of law” supplies the 
principles to resolve the controversy, depending on its nature. Louisiana 
Mineral Code article 2 provides the starting point for this hierarchy: 
The provisions of this Code are supplementary to those of the 
Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable specifically to the subject 
matter of mineral law. In the event of conflict between the 
provisions of this Code and those of the Civil Code or other laws 
the provisions of this Code shall prevail. If this Code does not 
expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the Civil 
Code or other laws are applicable.13 
As pertaining to mineral leases—and contracts to which they pertain—this 
direction to turn to the Mineral Code, rather than to the “Civil Code or 
other laws” in matters of mineral law, is concordant with Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2672, which provides that a “mineral lease is governed by the 
Mineral Code.”14 
If the Mineral Code “does not expressly or impliedly provide for a 
particular situation, the Civil Code or other laws are applicable.”15 In this 
sense, other provisions in the Civil Code and the Revised Statutes are said 
to be “suppletive” to the Mineral Code in that those sources will “fill in 
the blanks” if the Mineral Code does not provide an answer or guidance 
with regard to a particular issue under the mineral law of this state.16  
                                                                                                             
 13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2. 
 14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2672. 
 15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2. 
 16. The distinction between an “imperative” law and a “suppletive” law has 
been explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court as follows: 
Statutory rules may be either imperative or suppletive. Rooted in public 
policy considerations, an imperative rule is applied without regard to the 
intention of the individuals concerned. A prohibitory law . . . is one that 
is cast in the imperative form, but exhibits a negative, rather than 
positive, command. . . . A suppletive rule, on the other hand, applies only 
if those affected by it have not excluded its application. . . . Thus, 
distinction between imperative and suppletive rules determines whether 
private individuals can set aside rules established by the legislature and 
regulate their legal relations by private agreement. If an agreement 
contravenes an imperative rule, it is absolutely null; thus, it is not subject 
to ratification and may be annulled in judicial proceedings instituted by 
any interested party. 
E. L. Burns Co. v. Cashio, 302 So. 2d 297, 300 (La. 1974) (footnotes omitted). 
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A recognized hierarchy exists for the resolution of an issue pertaining 
to a controversy or dispute between a seller and purchaser of mineral 
leases under a PSA: (1) the PSA itself, as the “law between the parties”;17 
(2) the Louisiana Mineral Code, if the PSA does not address a particular 
“subject matter of mineral law”;18 (3) the Civil Code, the Revised Statutes, 
or “other [applicable] laws,” if the Louisiana Mineral Code “does not 
expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation”;19 (4) if neither 
the purchase and sale agreement nor legislation address a particular subject 
or issue, resort may be had to custom and usages of the industry;20 and (5) 
if neither the PSA nor legislation nor custom “provide for a particular 
situation,” reference may be had to equitable considerations.21 
D. Influence of Decisions of Other States22 
Because of the nature of the oil and gas industry, and in recognition of 
the fact that certain issues, practices, and agreements are common in many 
oil and gas producing states, the courts of Louisiana have occasionally 
taken cognizance of the published decisions of other states where a 
particular issue has not previously been considered by a court in Louisiana. 
This is particularly true with respect to the alienation of a mineral lease, in 
contrast to the mineral servitude or mineral royalty, because of the 
functional similarity of the Louisiana mineral lease to the lease contract in 
other states. More importantly, although the mineral lease is also 
contractually based, the other types of mineral rights are essentially 
codally based.23 
                                                                                                             
 17. “Contracts have the effect of law for the parties.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983. 
 18. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. “Custom results from practice repeated for a long time and generally 
accepted as having acquired the force of law. Custom may not abrogate 
legislation.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3; see also id. art. 2054. This last cited article 
“applies in circumstances where the contract is not ambiguous or doubtful, but 
simply fails to address a particular question.” Ellwood Oil Co. v. Anderson, 655 
So. 2d 694, 697 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 21. “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation 
or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, 
resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 4. 
 22. Portions of this Section are an adaptation of Patrick S. Ottinger, From the 
Courts to the Code: The Origin and Development of the Law of Louisiana on 
Mineral Rights, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 5 (2012). 
 23. The intrinsic attributes of a mineral servitude and a mineral royalty are 
set forth in the Mineral Code with limited opportunity to alter those principles. In 
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As the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated, “[a]lthough the decisions 
of other jurisdictions are not controlling on the Courts of Louisiana, if they 
determine an issue practically identical with the one under consideration, 
they possess at least a persuasive effect and merit attention.”24 The most 
prominent example of the influence of a foreign court on an important 
issue under Louisiana mineral law is the recognition that the Louisiana law 
pertaining to the doctrine of production in “paying quantities” finds its 
genesis in a ruling of the Supreme Court of Texas.25 Indeed, as noted in 
the official comment to Mineral Code article 124, Louisiana’s current law 
on this subject is fashioned in large part on the pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court of Texas in Clifton v. Koontz.26 Beyond that particular 
concept, Louisiana courts have considered cases from other oil and gas 
producing states in litigation over royalty payments based upon “market 
value,”27 the treatment of “post-production costs,”28 and the interpretation 
of the model form operating agreement.29 
A number of cases involving the purchase and sale of producing oil 
and gas properties have been decided under the laws of other states, 
particularly if no Louisiana case has addressed the issue.30 It must be 
understood, however, that a sales transaction governed by Louisiana law 
would be controlled by the substantive provisions of the Civil Code 
relative to sale, and would not be governed by principles of law of another 
                                                                                                             
contrast, the mineral lease is a contract, and the principles of “freedom of 
contract” apply with minimal limitations arising out of public policy. 
 24. C H F Fin. Co. v. Jochum, 127 So. 2d 534, 539 (La. 1961); see also 
Michiels v. Succession of Gladden, 180 So. 862, 864 (La. Ct. App. 1938), aff’d, 
183 So. 217 (1938). 
 25. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:124 cmt. (2000). 
 26. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959); see also Patrick S. Ottinger, Production in 
“Paying Quantities”—A Fresh Look, 65 LA. L. REV. 635 (2005); Patrick S. 
Ottinger, Production in “Paying Quantities”—A Fresh Look, 51 ANN. INST. ON 
MIN. L. 24 (2004). 
 27. See, e.g., Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (La. 
1982) (“We note that the same or similar contract language has often been 
interpreted by the courts of other jurisdictions . . . .”); Shell Oil Co. v. Williams, 
Inc., 428 So. 2d 798, 801 (La. 1983) (“In our review of the jurisprudence of other 
jurisdictions, we note that the Texas Supreme Court and the United States Court 
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, have addressed this issue.”).  
 28. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1336 (citing, but not following, Texas Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968)). 
 29. See, e.g., Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petroleum Co., 112 So. 3d 187 
(La. 2013). In the interest of full disclosure, your Author represented certain amici 
curiae in this suit. 
 30. See infra Part III.C.3. 
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state.31 Still, these other cases are helpful to the extent that they consider 
and explain the meaning and purpose of certain clauses or provisions that 
are customary to PSAs in common use in this sector of the oil and gas 
industry.  
II. PROVISIONS OF THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE PERTINENT TO THE 
SALE AND ASSIGNMENT OF MINERAL LEASES 
When the intent of the parties to a PSA of producing properties is not 
to the contrary, considering some important provisions of the Louisiana 
Mineral Code that are pertinent to the purchase and sale of mineral leases 
is essential. In fact, some of these provisions may not be altered by contract 
because they are rules of public order.32 This Part will examine some 
important Mineral Code rules as well as their relation to provisions in other 
areas of Louisiana law. 
A. The Alienability of a Mineral Lease33 
A little over a century ago, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered—
and rejected—a contention that a contract for the exploration and 
development of minerals34 was not assignable on the asserted theory that 
such contract was “personal on the part of the obligor.”35 This suggestion 
was based on the lessor’s contention that “the obligation ‘to drill with a 
view to finding commercial substances’ is purely personal on the part of 
the obligor.”36 The court did not consider this argument, determining that 
the “contract does not purport to impose any such obligation on [the 
obligor].”37 The lessor then urged that the contract was not assignable 
because “no mention is made in it of assigns, or of the right to assign.”38 
This argument—that contractual silence or omission resulted in a negation 
of the right to assign—was summarily rejected by the Court: 
                                                                                                             
 31. See infra Part IV.J.3. 
 32. See infra Part II.B. 
 33. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of OTTINGER, supra note 12.  
 34. At the time of this decision, the courts had not fully determined the 
juridical or legal character of what is now recognized as a “mineral lease.” For the 
history of the development of the mineral lease in Louisiana, see William M. Hall, 
The Juridical Nature of the Mineral Lease, 11 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 106 (1964). 
 35. Anse La Butte (Le Danois) Oil & Mineral Co. v. Babb, 47 So. 754, 755 
(La. 1908). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
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But, manifestly, there was no need of any such mention, since a man 
may assign whatever right not purely personal to himself he may be 
the owner of. The rule is that all things of value, incorporeal as well 
as corporeal, may be made the subject of sale.39 
Thus, being a “thing of value,” or an item of commerce, a mineral lease is 
freely assignable. Today, a series of articles in both the Louisiana Mineral 
Code and the Louisiana Revised Civil Code establish this uncontroversial 
proposition.40  
B. Inapplicability of the Remedy of Lesion Beyond Moiety41 
A necessary corollary of the fact that a mineral lease is a “real right”42 
and an “incorporeal immovable”43 is that all laws pertinent to immovable 
property with certain limited exceptions apply to a mineral lease.44 
One law applicable to the sale of immovable property in general, but 
which does not apply to the sale or assignment of a mineral lease, is the 
vendor’s remedy of lesion beyond moiety.45 Lesion beyond moiety 
involves a seller’s rescission of a sale of a corporeal immovable “when the 
price is less than one half of the fair market value of the immovable.”46 
Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 states that a “sale of a mineral [lease] 
is not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.”47 The reason for this 
rule is that, by their very nature, the valuation and the existence of minerals 
is highly speculative.48 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2448 (1870)). 
 40. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:18, :127 (2000); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
454, 470, 1984, 2448 (2015). 
 41. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of OTTINGER, supra note 
12, ch. 2, pt. I. 
 42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16. 
 43. Id. § 31:18. 
 44. “Mineral rights, including mineral leases, are classified under the Mineral 
Code as incorporeal immovables and are subject to the Civil Code articles 
respecting immovable property.” Guy Scroggins, Inc. v. Emerald Exploration, 
401 So. 2d 680, 684 (La. Ct. App. 1981). In the interest of full disclosure, your 
Author represented the defendant in this suit. 
 45. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17. 
 46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2015). 
 47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17. 
 48. See McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632, 633 (La. 1936) (“A 
review of the cases on that subject-matter shows that damages were not allowed 
because of the uncertain and speculative nature of the loss complained of. One of 
the reasons which we assigned in this case when it was previously before us for 
sustaining the exceptions of no cause and no right of action was that ‘the loss 
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Although lesion does not apply to the “sale of a mineral [lease],”49 one 
should note that this article is probably not needed because “[l]esion can be 
claimed only by the seller and only in sales of corporeal immovables.”50  
C. Other Consequences Arising Out of the Assignment of the Mineral 
Lease 
Each of the articles that follow article 127 of the Louisiana Mineral 
Code address distinct consequences arising out of an assignment or 
sublease of a mineral lease, and they do not differentiate themselves in 
reference to one type of transfer from the other.51 These consequences 
pertain principally to the assignment, not the PSA.52 Although important, 
these are beyond the scope of this Article. The reader may, however, refer 
to another Article by this Author for greater edification of these matters.53 
III. PROVISIONS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE PERTINENT TO THE SALE 
AND ASSIGNMENT OF MINERAL LEASES  
Because the sale of producing properties will invoke the law of the 
Bayou State, it is instructive to examine the various types of agreements that 
might be involved in this transaction. An array of agreements might be 
entered into by the parties in anticipation of a purchase and sale of producing 
properties. Fundamentally, the Louisiana Civil Code recognizes types of 
agreements that are preparatory to the sale, as well as agreements of sale. A 
sale is a “nominate contract,” which is defined in Louisiana Civil Code 
article 1914 as being “those [contracts] given a special designation such as 
sale, lease, loan, or insurance.”54 That same codal authority informs that 
other agreements associated with the sale may be classified as “innominate,” 
as they “are those [contracts] with no special designation.”55 
                                                                                                             
complained of was, manifestly, more a matter of uncertainty and speculation than 
of fact or estimate.’”). 
 49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17. 
 50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589. 
 51. Each article treats of both assignments and subleases, referencing both an 
assignor and an assignee, and a sublessor and a sublessee, thus indicating that the 
subject matter of each article pertains to both types of conveyance. 
 52. As will be seen, the PSA is a contract to sell, not the sale itself. 
 53. Patrick S. Ottinger, What’s in a Name? Assignments and Subleases of 
Mineral Leases Under Louisiana Law, 58 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 283 (2011). 
 54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1914. 
 55. Id. 
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A. Applicability of the Law of Sales 
At its core, the sale of producing oil and gas properties is the sale of 
immovable property. Although the principal asset involved in a transaction 
embodied in a PSA pertaining to producing oil and gas properties is 
subject to the law of lease, the alienation of that asset is indisputably 
addressed in the context of the law of sale. “Sale is a contract whereby a 
person transfers ownership of a thing to another for a price in money.”56 
Indeed, in the vernacular, the sale of producing oil and gas properties is 
the sale of “real estate,” such that case law dealing with the purchase and 
sale of land—or even of a residence or commercial building—is pertinent. 
Therefore, cases involving sale agreements of land can provide guidance 
on related issues.  
The terms of the PSA, however, may subject it to some other area of 
Louisiana law. For example, if an overriding royalty interest or some other 
form of control is reserved, the transaction is, in legal contemplation, a 
sublease, not a sale.57 A sublease is essentially a “lease of a lease,” with 
the result that the law of lease would be the controlling regime. The 
Supreme Court has stated that a “sublessor . . . assumes all rights, interest, 
obligations, penalties, etc., enjoyed by and granted to the original lessor.”58 
B. Agreements Preparatory to the Sale 
Some agreements may be made in preparation of a sales contract. The 
Louisiana Civil Code recognizes three particular types of such agreements: 
an option, a contract to sell, and a right of first refusal. Although each type 
of agreement preparatory to sale is subject to distinct rules, which are 
detailed below, it is important to note some common governing principles 
that apply to all of these agreements.  
Some common governing principles of agreements preparatory to sale 
are especially important for the present discussion. For one, all nominate 
agreements preparatory to sale involving immovables have limited 
effectiveness against third persons: “An option, right of first refusal, or 
contract to sell that involves immovable property is effective against third 
persons only from the time the instrument that contains it is filed for registry 
in the parish where the immovable is located.”59 Secondly, the option and 
right of first refusal are subject to additional limitations regarding 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. art. 2439. 
 57. See Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. 379, 380 (La. 1928); Berman v. Brown, 
70 So. 2d 433, 445–46 (La. 1953). 
 58. Wier v. Grubb, 82 So. 2d 1, 7 (La. 1955). 
 59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2429.  
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permissible terms and divisibility. As for permissible terms, “[a]n option 
or a right of first refusal that concerns an immovable thing may not be 
granted for a term longer than ten years.”60 As for divisibility, “[t]he right 
to exercise an option and the right of first refusal are indivisible. When 
either of such rights belongs to more than one person all of them must 
exercise the right.”61 In addition to these general governing principles, 
each of the nominate agreements preparatory to sale having particular 
governing principles. 
1. Option 
An option to buy or sell is defined as “a contract whereby a party gives 
to another the right to accept an offer to sell, or to buy, a thing within a 
stipulated time.”62 The requirements of an option mirror the requirements of 
the sale it contemplates, including specification of the thing, specification of 
the price, and meeting relevant form requirements.63 As the Louisiana Civil 
Code makes clear, “[t]he acceptance or rejection of an offer contained in an 
option is effective when received by the grantor.”64 Although “[r]ejection 
of the offer contained in an option terminates the option,” an acceptance 
binds the parties to a contract to sell.65 In addition, an acceptance brings 
about certain warranties of the assignor by operation of law: “The assignor 
of an option to buy a thing warrants the existence of that option, but does 
not warrant that the person who granted it can be required to make a final 
sale.”66 
Although the requirement of a further act following acceptance of the 
option seems indispensable for immovables, it would also appear to make 
perfect sense for the transfer of certain movables, such as a drilling rig or 
shares of stock. At any rate, this rule is not mandatory, and the parties are 
always at liberty to provide otherwise in their agreement.67 It is not typical 
to encounter an option to sell producing oil and gas properties, principally 
for the reason that the risk of fluctuation of value would be on the optionor-
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. art. 2628 (“Nevertheless, if the option or right of first refusal is granted 
in connection with a contract that gives rise to obligations of continuous or 
periodic performance, an option or a right of first refusal may be granted for as 
long a period as required for the performance of those obligations.”). 
 61. Id. art. 2630. 
 62. Id. art. 2620. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. art. 2621. 
 65. Id. A counteroffer does not terminate the option. Id. 
 66. Id. art. 2622 (“If, upon exercise of the option, the person who granted it 
fails to make a final sale, the assignee has against the assignor the same rights as 
a buyer without warranty has against the seller.”). 
 67. See id. arts. 7, 1983. 
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seller, not on the optionee-purchaser who enjoys the ability to enforce a 
sale by exercising the option or simply walk away with impunity.68 
2. Contract to Sell 
The contract to sell is defined as “[a]n agreement whereby one party 
promises to sell and the other promises to buy a thing at a later time, or upon 
the happening of a condition, or upon performance of some obligation by 
either party.”69 Thus, such a contract does not immediately transfer 
ownership of the thing. The contract does, however, “give[] either party the 
right to demand specific performance.”70 Like the option, a contract to sell 
“must set forth the thing and the price, and meet the formal requirements 
of the sale it contemplates.”71 
3. Right of First Refusal 
The “right of first refusal” is an arrangement that is both common and 
important to the parties. The exercise of a right of first refusal would result 
in the subtraction of an asset from the transaction and a concomitant 
reduction in the purchase price. By the same token, if the holder of a 
preferential right of purchase is not properly and timely notified, its rights 
are not diminished and litigation could ensue after the closing of the 
transaction. These issues, and others, are an important component of both 
due diligence and closing the transaction. 
a. General 
The “right of first refusal,” pacte de préférence, is a unilateral juridical 
act whereby “[a] party . . . agree[s] that he will not sell a certain thing 
without first offering it to a certain person,” which “may be enforced by 
specific performance.”72 As the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear, “[t]he 
grantor of a right of first refusal may not sell to another person unless he 
has offered to sell the thing to the holder of the right on the same terms, or 
on those specified when the right was granted if the parties have so 
agreed.”73 Thus, the grantor of a right of first refusal (unlike the grantor of 
                                                                                                             
 68. Of course, the doctrine of “freedom of contact” would permit contracting 
parties to construct an opportunity for the optionor to terminate, or even foreclose 
the optionee’s exercise of, the option if values of product reach a certain level. 
 69. Id. art. 2623. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. art. 2625. 
 73. Id. art. 2626. 
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an option) is only conditionally bound to enter into a contract of sale if and 
when that person is contemplating selling to another. 
The right of first refusal is subject to default (suppletive) temporal 
limitations based on the nature of the object of the right: “Unless otherwise 
agreed, an offer to sell the thing to the holder of a right of first refusal must 
be accepted within ten days from the time it is received if the thing is 
movable, and within thirty days from that time if the thing is immovable.”74 
If the grantor fails to conclude a sale or contract to sell with a third person 
within six months of the grantee being able to exercise its right of first 
refusal, however, that right will subsist even if the grantee failed to exercise 
it.75 
b. “Pref Rights” in the Industry 
Finding that the properties are subject to a “preferential right to 
purchase”—often called a “pref right” in the jargon of the industry—is not 
uncommon.76 Indeed, the model form operating agreement, which is 
prevalently used in Louisiana, contains a “preferential right to purchase” 
provision, although parties are free to delete it.77 
Case law in Louisiana enforces these types of arrangements, and it is 
an ordinary and necessary part of due diligence to, first, identify these 
rights, and then to seek to secure a waiver or lapse of time without exercise 
of a “pref right.” Case law in Texas explains the “pref right,” as follows: 
A preferential right, also known as a right of first refusal or 
preemptive right, is a right granted to a party giving him or her the 
first opportunity to purchase property if the owner decides to sell 
it. A preferential right has been described as a dormant option. 
Once the property owner conveys the terms of the offer to the 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. art. 2627. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See Robert J. Sergesketter, Preferential Rights to Purchase: The Basics, 
and the Most Interesting Pref. Rights Case You’ve Never Heard About, HOUS. L. 
REV.: OFF THE RECORD, Spring 2015, at 43, 46 (“First, let us get some 
nomenclature out of the way. Preferential Rights to Purchase often are referred to 
as Rights of First Refusal, or ‘RoFRs.’ They also are referred to as Preferential 
Purchase Rights (the naming convention primarily used in this Article), 
Preferential Rights, Pref. Rights, Preemptive Rights, and Contingent Rights.”). 
 77. A widely used form of operating agreement (in the Bayou State and 
elsewhere), is the AAPL Form 610—the Model Form Operating Agreement 
published by the American Association of Professional Landmen (AAPL). First 
introduced in 1956 at its Annual Meeting in Denver, Colorado, revised forms were 
issued by the AAPL in 1977, 1982 and 1989.  
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rightholder, the rightholder then has the power to accept or reject 
the offer. Thus, when the property owner gives notice of his intent 
to sell, the preferential right matures or “ripens” into an 
enforceable option.78 
The offer to purchase must strictly abide by the requirements of the 
agreement. For example, a violation of a right of first refusal (“ROFR”) 
contained in an operating agreement was found in Fordoche, Inc. v. 
Texaco, Inc.79 In that case, the ROFR clause of the Joint Operating 
Agreement (“JOA”) provided as follows: 
Before the sale to a third party by any Operating Party of its 
interest, in whole or in part, in the properties affected by this 
agreement, the other Operating Parties shall be given the refusal 
thereof at the best price offered in good faith by a third party, and 
such other Operating Parties shall have the preferred right to 
purchase at the price stated, which right shall be exercised within 
thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of the offer made by 
a third party . . . .80 
The court noted that “[i]t is self-evident that the 1962 [JOA] extends 
appellants’ ROFR to TEPI’s entire working interest in its mineral leases 
subject to that JOA. The text of that agreement provides, ‘before the sale 
to a third party . . . of its interest . . . in the properties affected by this 
agreement.’”81 The court held that “TEPI violated the August 29, 1962 
JOA by failing to offer the entirety of its interest in the property affected 
by the JOA to the Fordoche group, yet thereafter selling the entirety to a 
third-party buyer, EnerVest.”82 
Unique and difficult issues arise in a “package sale” involving 
multiple fields where the ROFR burdens less than all of the properties 
proposed to be sold by the seller. The necessity arises to allocate values 
among the properties, so that any exercise of a “pref right” can be 
effectuated on an equitable basis. The courts in Texas do not require a 
holder of a preferential right to also acquire other assets in the “package,” 
                                                                                                             
 78. FWT, Inc. v. Haskin Wallace Mason Prop. Mgmt., L.L.P., 301 S.W.3d 
787, 793 (Tex. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
 79. 463 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 80. Id. at 393. 
 81. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 82. Id.  
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which were not subject to the “pref right” but were offered with the assets 
burdened by the right.83 
Additionally, issues may be presented if, rather than selling the 
affected assets, a party divests the property by involuntary sales,84 by 
donations, or by entering into a transfer of the stock of the record title 
owner. This important component of a PSA has been the subject of 
commentary85 as well as litigation in the Bayou State. 
In Fina Oil and Chemical Co. v. Amoco Production Co.,86 Fina, the 
non-operator, and Amoco, the operator, owned certain mineral leases in 
equal indivision.87 The leases were subject to a joint operating agreement, 
which contained a “preferential right to purchase” provision.88 In connection 
with a corporate reorganization, Amoco transferred the entirety of its 
interest to a subsidiary corporation, MW Petroleum Corporation (“MW”).89 
Thereafter, Amoco sold all of the corporate stock in MW to Apache 
Corporation.90 
                                                                                                             
 83. Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 534–35 
(Tex. App. 2008). 
 84. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a right of first refusal applied 
to a judicial sale. Price v. Town of Ruston, 132 So. 653, 656 (La. 1931). 
 85. See, e.g., Harry M. Reasoner, Preferential Purchase Rights in Oil and 
Gas Instruments, 46 TEX. L. REV. 57 (1967); Harlan Abright, Preferential Right 
Provisions and Their Applicability to Oil and Gas Instruments, 32 SW. L.J. 803 
(1978); Jeffrey J. Scott, Restrictions on Alienation Applied to Oil and Gas 
Transactions, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1985); John English, Dealing 
with Third Parties, 43 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 169 (1996); Terry I. Cross, The Ties 
that Bind: Preemptive Rights and Restraints on Alienation that Commonly Burden 
Oil and Gas Properties, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 93 (1999); Aimee L. Williams, 
Restrictions on Assignment – Consent to Assign, Preferential Right to Purchase and 
Maintenance of Uniform Interest Provisions, 49 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 224 (2002); 
John R. Cooney, Recent Developments Concerning Joint Operating Agreements—
Preferential Rights and Exculpatory Clauses, 55 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. 11-1 
(2004); Gerald F. Slattery, Jr., Understanding Area of Mutual Interest, Preferential 
Rights and Maintenance of Uniform Interest Provisions in Joint Operating 
Agreements, 56 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 323 (2009); Fred R. Pletcher & Anthony A. 
Zoobkoff, ROFR Madness! Rights of First Refusal in Mining and Oil & Gas 
Transactions, 56 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1 (2010); Robert K. Wise et al., 
First-Refusal Rights Under Texas Law, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 433 (2010); Rick 
Strange & Thomas Fahring, Rights of First Refusal and Package Oil and Gas 
Transactions, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 29 (2011); Sergesketter, supra note 76. 
 86. 673 So. 2d 668 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 87. Id. at 670. 
 88. Id. at 671. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 672. 
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Neither the transfer of the leasehold interest by Amoco to MW nor the 
sale of the corporate stock in MW by Amoco to Apache were offered to 
Fina in accordance with the “preferential right to purchase” provision 
contained in the joint operating agreement.91 The provision explicitly did 
not apply to transfers by a corporate party in connection with a merger, 
consolidation, or reorganization to a parent, subsidiary, or affiliated 
company.92 
Fina filed suit, claiming that the transfer of the leasehold interest by 
Amoco to MW triggered the preferential rights option contained in the 
operating agreement.93 Fina admitted that “the sale of some or all of the 
corporate stock of Amoco, while Amoco owned the lease interests, would 
not have triggered the preferential rights and operator selection clauses.”94 
According to the court, the “question then becomes why should the sale of 
MW stock, while MW held the lease interests, engender a different 
result?”95 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, agreeing that no 
genuine issues of material fact remained.96 As stated by the court, the “issue 
was whether, as a matter of law, the sale of stock of MW, the holder of the 
lease interests, triggered the preferential rights operator selection clauses.”97 
The court held as follows: 
The transfer of the lease interests to MW was admittedly a valid 
transfer. The sale of MW stock was not a sale or transfer of the 
lease interests. MW still holds the lease interests. Thus, no transfer 
of the lease interests occurred. Without a transfer of the lease 
interests, the provisions of the various JOAs are not triggered. 
How or whether MW can validly transfer the lease interests under 
the JOAs is not the question before this court.98 
A creative attempt to circumvent the right of first refusal by characterizing 
a proposed transaction as a merger, rather than a sale, was unsuccessful in 
one case not involving oil and gas properties.99 In McCarthy v. Osborn, the 
plaintiff owned corporate stock subject to a restriction on transfer, requiring 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 671. 
 93. Id. at 672. 
 94. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 670. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 676. 
 99. McCarthy v. Osborn, 65 So. 2d 776 (La. 1953). 
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that the shares “offered for sale” first be offered to the shareholders.100 As 
the court noted: 
According to the petition, the stockholders and the Board of 
Directors first attempted to sell the stock and assets of the Osborn 
Life Insurance Company. They abandoned their intention to sell 
when the plaintiff opposed it and offered to purchase the stock of 
the corporation which she had a perfect right to do under the 
provisions of the charter and stock certificates heretofore set out. 
The allegations of the petition are to the effect that the so-called 
merger is nothing more than a sale. In other words, a sale 
disguised as a merger to eliminate the plaintiff's rights.101 
The trial court sustained an objection of no cause of action,102 but the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding, as follows: 
We have carefully examined the petition and have arrived at the 
conclusion that the facts alleged are sufficient to show that by the 
manipulation of the Board of Directors and stockholders that the 
plaintiff was defrauded of her rights and prevented from having a 
proprietary interest in the so-called merged or new corporation.103 
An attempt to circumvent the right of first refusal by characterizing a 
transfer as a dation en paiement, rather than a sale, was disallowed in 
another case104 in which the court explained its disallowance of the 
scheme: 
Because the dation en paiement transfers ownership and has the 
same effect as an ordinary sale, drawing a meaningless distinction 
between a sale and a dation en paiement in the context of this 
contract would allow the Optimist Club to circumvent its 
obligation simply on the basis of semantics. The object of the 
February 20, 1974 contract was to give Mr. Gorum the right of 
first refusal to the property in the event the Optimist Club decided 
to divest itself of ownership. We find that an interpretation that 
allows the Optimist Club to divest itself of ownership through a 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. at 777. 
 101. Id. at 778. 
 102. Id. at 776. 
 103. Id. at 778.  
 104. Gorum v. Optimist Club of Glenmora, 771 So. 2d 690 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
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dation en paiement without providing Mr. Gorum with a right of 
first refusal results in an absurd and unintended consequence.105 
Although the “pref right” provision in many operating agreements 
requires that the right holder be provided “full information concerning the 
proposed sale,” the courts tend to require “reasonable” information sufficient 
to provide “information considered material to the right holders’ ability to 
exercise the preferential right on the same terms and conditions as the bona 
fide purchaser.”106 
A holder of a “pref right” who is not notified does not thereby lose its 
rights.107 Rather, the purchaser of an asset burdened by a preferential right 
to purchase acquires the asset subject to the holder’s rights.108 Notice must 
be given to the right holder, who has a reasonable time to elect or decline 
to purchase the interest.109 
C. Other Associated Agreements 
It is customary to enter other types of arrangements in anticipation of the 
sale of the producing oil and gas assets. These agreements are innominate 
contracts that are intended to facilitate the transaction contemplated by the 
PSA. 
1. Confidentiality Agreements 
Parties often enter into a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement 
to protect certain non-public information from disclosure in the event the 
transaction does not close. Typically, this form of agreement is the first to 
be executed in anticipation of the ultimate execution of a PSA. 
An agreement of this type would obligate the purchaser to strictly 
maintain the confidentiality of, and agree to not disclose, the seller’s 
information of a private, sensitive nature, such as financial information, 
reserve reports, and other information that is not generally available to the 
public. A confidentiality agreement facilitates the conduct of due diligence 
by the purchaser and thus balances the legitimate interests of both the 
seller and the purchaser. The agreement is typically unilateral, obligating 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. at 695. 
 106. See, e.g., Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd., 225 
S.W.3d 577, 590 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 107. See McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
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the purchaser to keep confidential information obtained in a review of 
seller’s records. 
Generally, the scope of the seller’s information sought to be kept 
confidential is all information of the seller, particularly analyses, reports, 
studies, etc. By the same token, common exclusions from the scope of 
confidentiality include information that is: (a) not disclosed in writing or 
reduced to writing and so marked with an appropriate confidentiality 
legend within 30 days of disclosure; (b) already in the purchaser’s 
possession at the time of the disclosure; (c) part of the public domain—or 
later becomes part of the public domain—through no fault of the 
purchaser; (d) received from a third party having no obligations of 
confidentiality to the seller; (e) independently developed by the purchaser 
without using the confidential information; or (f) required by law or 
regulation to be disclosed. 
Additionally, the purchaser may still provide information that is 
subject to confidentiality and non-disclosure to its counsel, accountants, 
or bankers, but strictly for purposes of the transaction being considered. 
The careful seller might seek to impose a “need to know” limitation on 
those to whom the data may be permissibly shared. 
Once the sale is consummated, and the seller has received the 
consideration for the conveyed assets, the seller is generally no longer 
concerned with the manner in which the purchaser will utilize this 
information, unless its scope also encompasses assets retained, but not 
sold, by the seller. If the transaction is not consummated, the agreement 
will typically require the purchaser to return all information or destroy it 
and certify to the seller that it has been destroyed. 
Closely associated with the contractual arrangement that requires 
confidentiality of certain information is a question of whether certain data 
would constitute a “trade secret” to be regulated under the Louisiana 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.110  
2. Term Sheets 
A “term sheet” is less an agreement or a contract than a roadmap to a 
more formal agreement. Particularly in a larger, sophisticated transaction, 
parties deem it appropriate to make sure that, at the nascent stage of 
discussions and negotiations, both parties are “on the same page” and 
“heading in the same direction.” Thus, a “term sheet” is often prepared to 
                                                                                                             
 110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1431 to :1439 (2003 & Supp. 2016); see also 
John Anthony Chavez, More Priceless than Gold: Trade Secrets in the Oil and 
Gas Industry, 46 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 1 (1999). 
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set forth the salient or material features of the anticipated transaction, 
including terms, conditions and considerations, sometimes merely in the 
form of “bullet points.” The execution of a “term sheet” serves as a guide 
to the lawyer preparing a draft of a “letter of intent,” or PSA. 
3. Letters of Intent 
Once parties reach a preliminary understanding pertinent to the sale of 
the properties, perhaps—but not necessarily—reduced to a “term sheet,” 
entering into a Letter of Intent (“LOI”) is common.111 Generally, this is a 
basic document that sets forth in greater detail the salient features of the 
transaction and is intended to constitute a framework to lead the parties to 
the confection of a more formal agreement. If the parties intend for the 
LOI to merely be a more formalized document than the “term sheet” and 
do not wish to be bound until a more formalized document is signed, that 
intent should be made expressly.112 
Indeed, Louisiana Civil Code article 1947 instructs that, “[w]hen, in 
the absence of a legal requirement, the parties have contemplated a certain 
form, it is presumed that they do not intend to be bound until the contract 
is executed in that form.”113 For example, parties were not bound to a LOI 
that stated, “[o]bviously, neither of us will be bound until a contract is 
executed by both parties.”114 
Nevertheless, depending on the language utilized, the court might find 
a sufficient “meeting of the minds” to enforce such an agreement, 
notwithstanding that the parties had called it “preliminary.” For example, in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co.,115 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court noted that the use of the word preliminary “does not preclude the 
agreement from being final until later agreements are reached or from being 
the only agreement in the event that no other agreements are confected.”116 
                                                                                                             
 111. This type of agreement is sometimes called a “memorandum of 
understanding,” or “MOU.” 
 112. Breaux Bros. Constr. Co. v. Associated Contractors, 77 So. 2d 17, 20 (La. 
1954) (“It is elementary in our law, that where the negotiations contemplate and 
provide that there shall be a contract in writing, neither party is bound until the 
writing is perfected and signed.” (citing Fredericks v. Fasnacht, 30 La. Ann. 117 
(1878) (emphasis in original))). 
 113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1947 (2015). 
 114. Spillway Invs., L.L.C. v. Pilot Travel Ctrs. LLC, No. Civ.A.04-2451, 
2005 WL 517498, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2005). 
 115. 447 So. 2d 469 (La. 1984). In the interest of full disclosure, the Author of 
this Article represented a defendant in this suit. 
 116. Id. at 472. 
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Further, the court found that the reference to a document “finalizing the 
points listed above” did not evince an intent to be bound only upon the 
execution of a later instrument.117 Nor did an allusion to future 
“negotiations” render the “preliminary” agreement non-binding.118 To the 
contrary, the Supreme Court held that the document was binding, as that 
interpretation most accurately reflected the intentions of the parties.119 
In Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, a case involving the anticipated 
purchase and sale of producing properties,120 Chesapeake entered into an 
agreement with Peak to acquire “deep rights” in the Haynesville Shale for 
“the hefty sum of $15,000 per acre.”121 The parties entered an agreement in 
July 2008, entitled “Offer to Purchase.”122 The court recounted how the 
controversy arose: “When the price of natural gas plummeted several 
months later, Chesapeake refused to honor its commitment.”123 Peak filed 
suit to enforce the agreement.124  
Chesapeake made two main arguments. First, “Chesapeake insisted 
the July Agreement was simply an agreement to negotiate, or LOI, and not 
binding. It claimed the agreement did not meet the requirements of the 
Texas statute of frauds and was too indefinite to be enforced.”125 The court 
rejected this defense, finding that “the property description contained in 
the July Agreement achieves the same degree of ‘reasonable certainty’ 
found in other ‘recital of ownership’ cases,” such that the court could 
“conclude that the Agreement contains an adequate nucleus of description 
under the statute of frauds.”126 
Another argument by Chesapeake was “that the July Agreement is too 
indefinite to be enforced. Specifically, [Chesapeake] claim[ed] that the 
parties did not intend to bind themselves by signing the letter and that the 
agreement lacked essential terms.”127 This defense also failed, with the 
court finding that the “July Agreement was sufficiently definite to be 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(applying Texas law). 
 121. Id. at 314. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 315. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 319. 
 127. Id. at 320. 
716 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
 
 
enforced.”128 The court affirmed an award for the plaintiffs of nearly $20 
million.129 
An LOI might be hybrid in that, although the writing might not be 
intended to be binding, some provisions within the LOI should be 
expressly declared to be binding. Examples of these binding provisions in 
an otherwise non-binding writing include provisions dealing with 
confidentiality or non-disclosure, governing law, and the exclusivity of the 
LOI. These important components of the parties’ understanding, even in 
an otherwise non-binding LOI, are meaningless if not made binding and 
enforceable.130 Thus, an LOI seems to be non-binding, and no party can 
have any liability thereunder to the other party. 
In one significant case,131 however, the parties signed letters of intent 
and a confidentiality agreement in contemplation of a relationship to 
construct a crude oil pipeline from Oklahoma to Texas.132 Despite the 
numerous explicit statements negating the existence of any enforceable 
relationship, the court deemed the parties’ written agreements to be 
sufficiently ambiguous that a jury had to determine if the parties intended 
to be bound.133 Finding, despite the rather express repudiation of such a 
relationship, that a partnership had been formed, the jury awarded Energy 
Partners damages in the amount of $319 million.134 Thus, the parties’ 
numerous, explicit disavowals were not sufficient to overcome the 
subsequent conduct of the parties, particularly statements made to third 
parties.135 
4. Access or Boarding Agreements 
Depending on the character of the properties involved, the purchaser 
or its consultants may need to have access to properties of the seller to 
inspect such properties in association with the conduct of due diligence. 
Particularly in connection with marine operations, or other high-risk 
structural environments, the seller will insist that the purchaser execute an 
access or boarding agreement. This agreement will authorize, under 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. at 322. 
 129. Id. at 314. 
 130. Self-evidently, parties who desire confidentiality intend that such non-
disclosure covenants be binding and enforceable, even if the LOI is not intended 
to manifest a binding agreement. 
 131. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., v. Enter. Prods. Partners, L.P., No. DC 
1112667, 2014 WL 10120268, at *1 (Tex. Dist. July 29, 2014).  
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
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conditions stipulated therein, the purchaser and its consultants to enter the 
property and conduct inspection or investigatory activities. 
Typically, the access will be limited to specified times with advance 
notice and accompanied by the seller’s designated representatives. The 
purchaser will typically not be allowed to conduct intrusive, invasive, or 
destructive inspections that alter or damage the property being inspected. 
The purchaser will also be obligated to release the seller from liability in 
advance and to indemnify the seller from any liability caused or damages 
incurred by the purchaser or its investigatory team. 
5. Transition Agreements 
Typically, three critical dates are involved in a transaction concerning 
the purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties. The first is the 
date of execution of the PSA, principally relevant in that it commences 
certain periods of time, such as the due diligence period and the title defect 
date by which the purchaser must assert any title, environmental, or other 
defects discovered by its due diligence. Usually, the failure on the part of 
the purchaser to timely assert a title defect results in a waiver of that 
deficiency in title to the asset. 
The effective date of the transaction is the next significant date. The 
effective date is often some date—typically, 7:00 A.M. on the first date of 
a calendar month—which precedes the date of execution of the agreement. 
The final date of note is the date of closing. Although stipulated in the 
PSA, this date is often deferred to a later date if necessary to conclude due 
diligence or to obtain necessary consents or waivers from third parties. 
When the transaction is consummated at the closing date, the purchaser 
rarely assumes the management and administration of the conveyed assets 
immediately. Because of the complexities of the purchase and sale of 
producing properties, parties might execute a “transition agreement,” which 
envisions that, for some period of time after the closing date, the seller will 
continue to operate the property until the purchaser is in a position to assume 
those responsibilities of ownership. Generally, this agreement includes an 
undertaking by the seller to continue to produce oil and gas, market the 
production, to receive the proceeds, to pay severance taxes and royalties, 
and to pay vendors for their services or equipment, all for the account of the 
purchaser.  
If the assets are complex and numerous, perhaps located in multiple 
parishes or states, an agreement of this sort allows a seamless and uninterrupted 
transition of ownership that permits the purchaser a period of time to 
familiarize itself with the assets and to set up its records so that it might 
assume administrative duties. 
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From the viewpoint of the seller, the agreement allows it to maintain 
the value of the assets, for the benefit of both parties, by avoiding any 
mistakes or missteps because the seller will continue to operate in the same 
manner as it has historically done. The purchaser benefits from a transition 
agreement as it is afforded the time to add requisite systems, personnel, or 
equipment to manage these new assets and also to obtain necessary 
regulatory approvals or permits. 
If the property being sold and acquired is subject to an existing 
operating agreement with third parties—other than the seller and the 
purchaser—it is necessary to review that agreement to ensure that no 
violation arises by reason of the sale. As a consequence of the sale, the 
seller no longer owns an interest in the Contract Area and is deemed to 
forfeit the right to operate the properties for the joint account.136  
Additionally, the COPAS attached to the JOA should be reviewed to 
ensure that costs being charged in this interim arrangement are consistent 
with the strictures of that agreement, including the competitiveness of rates 
charged for services.137 If the seller has served as operator, it might have 
master service agreements in place with a variety of contractors or service 
providers. Some period of time is necessary to transition those agreements 
to the new operator. 
The transition from seller to the purchaser is facilitated by periodic 
meetings between representatives of the parties to coordinate activities in 
the interim period of time, until the purchaser is ready to fully assume 
responsibility for operational activities of the assets that it acquires at the 
closing. Typically, under the regime of the transition agreement, the seller 
is required to conduct its activities in a good and workmanlike manner and 
as a reasonably prudent operator. Because of the hazardous nature of oil 
and gas activities, it should be clarified and affirmed that the seller’s 
employees remain the employees of the seller and not of the purchaser for 
any purpose. The purchaser customarily indemnifies the seller from 
liability, except for the willful misconduct or gross negligence of the seller 
                                                                                                             
 136. A common provision in the model form operating agreement states that, 
“[i]f Operator . . . no longer owns an interest hereunder in the Contract Area, . . ., 
Operator shall be deemed to have resigned without any action by Non-Operators, 
except the selection of a successor.” AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement, 
Form 610 (1982). 
 137. COPAS is the acronym for the Council of Petroleum Accountants 
Societies. Mack Energy Co. v. Expert Oil & Gas, LLC, 159 So. 3d 437, 439 (La. 
2015). COPAS procedures are a form of accounting procedure, which is the 
standard in the oil and gas industry. See generally J. David Heaney, The Joint 
Operating Agreement, the AFE and COPAS: What They Fail to Provide, 29 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 772 (1983); John E. Jolly, The COPAS Accounting 
Procedures Demystified, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21-1 (1988). 
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or its employees. The parties should confirm that the insurance maintained 
by the parties covers the activities and interests of each party. 
If, for any reason, the purchaser is unable to operate the property after 
the closing, the parties might also enter into a contract operating agreement 
pursuant to which the seller or some other entity will operate the property 
for the account and benefit of the purchaser. The contract operator is 
typically compensated on a per diem, weekly, or monthly basis for its 
services. 
D. Agreements of Sale 
Although important, the PSA is not the document that announces to 
the world the transfer of the mineral leases from the seller to the purchaser. 
The PSA is not customarily recorded, and does not need to be. Rather, that 
important document provides and anticipates that the parties will evidence 
the consummation of the transaction by executing and recording an 
assignment. Although immaterial to its import,138 the name of the recorded 
document might be “Conveyance, Assignment and Bill of Sale” or simply 
“Assignment.”  
This recorded document often makes reference to the PSA and 
sometimes restates certain provisions that the parties deem the most 
significant. Generally, these incorporated clauses pertain to allocation or 
assumption of responsibility, agreements as to indemnity, and other 
provisions. Although the indemnity obligation is valid between the parties, 
regardless of whether the obligation is reflected of record, the beneficiary 
of the indemnity often finds a sense of comfort in providing notice to third 
persons of this particular arrangement. 
The Assignment, being the “contract of sale,” is regulated by a series 
of Louisiana Civil Code provisions. For one, the Assignment must contain 
the essential elements of a sale: the thing, the price, and the consent of the 
parties with respect to the thing and the price.139 The “thing” is the mineral 
lease(s) that is contemplated by the PSA, as well as all other “things” being 
sold, such as contracts, wells, equipment, records, etc. The “price” is the 
purchase price specified in the PSA, which might be revised or adjusted in 
accordance with its terms and provisions. Finally, the “consent” is self-
                                                                                                             
 138. See Howard Trucking Co. v. Stassi, 474 So. 2d 955, 960 (La. Ct. App. 1985) 
(“It is well-established that we are not bound by the label placed on a written 
agreement or the subjective intent of the contracting parties, but must look to the 
substance of the transaction in determining rights and obligations.”), aff’d, 485 So. 2d 
915 (La. 1986). 
 139. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439 (2015). 
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evidently manifested by the execution of both the PSA, and the resulting 
Assignment.  
Secondly, the Assignment must be in proper form. Because the object 
of the sale is immovable property, the Assignment “must be made by 
authentic act or by act under private signature, except as provided in 
Article 1839.”140 The “sale” is obviously embodied in a written agreement 
executed by the seller (the “assignor”) and the purchaser (the “assignee”) 
and is virtually never executed by way of an authentic act unless in the 
extremely rare case the parties employ a credit sale.141 Notably, article 2440 
makes an exception to the writing requirement “as provided in Article 
1839.”142 That cited article provides, in relevant part, that a “transfer of 
immovable property” may be made orally and “is valid between the parties,” 
provided that “the property has been actually delivered and the transferor 
recognizes the transfer when interrogated on oath.”143 
Thirdly, the Assignment transfers ownership “between the parties as 
soon as there is agreement on the thing and the price is fixed, even though 
the thing sold is not yet delivered nor the price paid.”144 Although a literal 
reading of this provision suggests that the PSA itself constitutes a vehicle 
by which ownership is transferred between the parties, one must recognize 
that the PSA—even though it constitutes an “agreement on the thing,” and 
“fixes the price”—contains numerous conditions and requirements that 
clearly negate any notion that it is intended to be the “agreement of sale” 
sufficient to transfer ownership. 
Fourthly, the Assignment “includes all accessories intended for its use 
in accordance with the law of property.”145 This provision is important to 
the assignee, as it ensures that the assignee acquires those “accessories 
intended for [the] use” of the mineral leases. Still, the exhibits attached to 
the PSA and which are virtually always attached to the assignment 
                                                                                                             
 140. Id. art. 2440. 
 141. Although a credit sale need not be executed by way of an authentic act to 
validly convey the assets, it would be necessary to utilize that form if the seller 
(mortgagor) in a credit sale wishes to employ executory process to enforce the 
reserved mortgage, and vendor’s privilege. See generally Patrick S. Ottinger, 
Enforcement of Real Mortgages by Executory Process, 51 LA. L. REV. 87 (1990). 
 142. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2440.  
 143. Id. art. 1839; see also Harter v. Harter, 127 So. 3d 5, 12 (La. Ct. App. 
2013) (upholding an oral transfer of a working interest based upon the 
corporation’s internal records and the conduct of the parties, and noting that, 
“since [defendant’s] actions evidence an actual delivery of the interests and he 
subsequently recognized such delivery under oath, the requirements for a valid 
oral transfer found in Article 1839 have been met”). 
 144. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2456. 
 145. Id. art. 2461. 
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typically will comprehensively describe and identify the contracts, wells, 
equipment, records, etc., that support and enhance the operation of the 
mineral leases conveyed. 
Finally, the Assignment must fix the price “in a sum either certain or 
determinable through a method agreed by them” and contemplate that the 
price, which may not be “out of all proportion with the value of the thing 
sold,” will actually be paid.146 The quality or sufficiency of the price being 
paid by the assignee for the mineral leases and other properties is rarely, 
if ever, an issue. The purchase price is robustly negotiated, and it is subject 
to adjustment depending on conditions specified in the PSA. Purely as a 
matter of custom and practice, parties do not usually set forth in the 
Assignment the precise amount paid by the purchaser for the assets. 
Usually, it is merely stipulated that “$100 and OVC” or some similar, 
nominal amount was paid to and received by the assignor.147 The failure 
to state the precise amount of the purchase price actually paid is not 
problematic, however, for “[a]n obligation may be valid even though its 
cause is not expressed.”148 Further, “[w]hen the expression of a cause in a 
contractual obligation is untrue, the obligation is still effective if a valid 
cause can be shown.”149 Indeed, one Louisiana court has held that “parol 
evidence is clearly admissible between the parties to show the real 
consideration of any contract.”150 Regardless, the “sale of a mineral right 
is not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.”151 
IV. CUSTOMARY FEATURES OF A PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
There are two alternative approaches to the acquisition of producing 
properties, perhaps with variations. Arguably the more prevalent approach 
involves the negotiation and ultimate execution of a PSA, which by its 
express terms allows the purchaser a period of time after such execution to 
conduct due diligence. The transaction will then proceed to a closing, unless 
due diligence reveals a sufficient monetary level of title or other defects that 
might afford the purchaser the option to “walk away” and to not close on 
the acquisition. 
Another approach is to “sign and close,” meaning that the PSA affords 
no post-execution period of time within which to conduct due diligence. 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. art. 2464. 
 147. “OVC” means “other valuable consideration.” 
 148. Id. art. 1969. 
 149. Id. art. 1970. 
 150. Great Sweet Grass Oils Co. v. Kroy-Am. Oils, Inc., 129 So. 2d 591, 594 
(La. Ct. App. 1961). 
 151. See supra Part II.C; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17 (2000). 
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Rather, with the due diligence being conducted before the execution of the 
PSA, the agreement merely obligates the purchaser to close the trade, pay 
the purchase price, and purchase the assets. In this scenario, the purchaser 
could also merely acquire the properties by way of a final assignment, 
which actually conveys the assets, dispensing with a PSA. However, there 
is often still a need for certain understandings between the parties, such as 
indemnities, assumptions of obligations, transitional terms, etc., that the 
parties might prefer to not place on record. If that is the case, the PSA will 
embody those terms that are not spread across the public records, with the 
recorded assignment effectuating the transfer of the assets from the seller 
to the purchaser.152 
In the former approach—involving the negotiation and execution of a 
PSA followed by a period of time to conduct due diligence and take other 
actions in anticipation of a closing—the PSA contains extensive 
procedures and provisions to effectuate the transaction contemplated. 
Although the length and scope of the PSA can vary greatly, depending on 
the nature of the properties and the relative sophistication of the 
contracting parties, the agreement will customarily contain an array of 
provisions to address the transaction.  
Limitations of space preclude a detailed, extensive consideration of all 
of the types of provisions that might be included and are often encountered. 
Rather, a few of the more consequential provisions will be considered in this 
Part. In addition, an enumeration of provisions that might be contained in a 
more sophisticated, comprehensively constructed purchase and sale 
agreement of producing properties is found in the Appendix to this 
Article.153 
A. Definitions 
The more sophisticated form of PSA will include a section containing 
a detailed definition of terms. In turn, these terms are employed throughout 
the PSA for consistency and ease of interpretation. For example, an 
important definition that permeates the agreement is the term “Effective 
Date,” or “Effective Time,” of the agreement.154 The fixing of the Effective 
                                                                                                             
 152. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2442 (“The parties to an act of sale or promise of 
sale of immovable property are bound from the time the act is made, but such an 
act is not effective against third parties until it is filed for registry according to the 
laws of registry.”). 
 153. See infra Appendix I. 
 154. The “Effective Date” or “Time” is usually the first day of some calendar 
month, at 7:00 A.M. Although now perhaps more a matter of lore than reality, the 
custom of the industry has historically been that production is gauged at that time 
of day. 
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Date promotes several important purposes, not the least of which is setting 
the anticipated demarcation point of ownership between the seller and the 
purchaser for purposes of cost responsibility and revenue entitlement. A 
number of other terms are important to define in the PSA, including 
perhaps most importantly the “Property” that is the object of the sale, and 
the “Purchase Price.” 
B. Property and Purchase Price 
Customarily, the initial portion of the PSA is devoted to an explanation 
of the essential provisions of the proposed sale. The essential provisions 
of the PSA, as with any sale under Louisiana Civil Code article 2439, 
involve the “thing” that constitutes the object of the contract of sale and 
the “price” to be paid by the vendee.155 As a result, the PSA will contain 
clauses that provide both for a statement of the assets to be sold and for a 
statement of the preliminary purchase price.  
1. Identification of Assets to be Sold and to be Excluded 
The heart of the agreement is the list of the assets to be conveyed. 
Utilizing defined terms to encompass the categories and types of property 
subject to the PSA and attached exhibits for greater specificity, the 
agreement generally contemplates the following types of property as being 
subject to the PSA: (a) mineral leases, including amendments, ratifications 
or corrections; (b) other operational contracts, such as farm-in or farm-out 
agreements, voluntary unit agreements, disposal agreements, and pipeline 
agreements; (c) servitudes, surface leases, rights-of-way, and licenses 
associated with, or dedicated to the use or operation of, the mineral leases; 
(d) hydrocarbons produced subsequent to the Effective Date of the PSA; 
(e) wells and equipment located on the lands covered by the mineral 
leases; and (f) books and records owned by the seller in connection with 
the assets to be conveyed. This is simply an enumeration of the essential 
assets that the parties typically contemplate to convey. Other particular 
properties can be listed in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
Of equal importance to an identification of the assets that are being 
conveyed is a statement of those assets of the seller that are not subject to 
the transaction and that the seller will retain. These are usually called 
“Excluded Assets” and might be defined as including the following types 
of property, by way of illustration only: (a) all audit rights and other rights 
and choses in action arising, occurring, or existing in favor of seller before 
                                                                                                             
 155. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439; see also id. art. 2623 (“A contract to sell must 
set forth the thing and the price . . . .”). 
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the Effective Date, or arising out of the operation of or production from the 
Oil and Gas Properties before the Effective Date, which include, but are not 
limited to, any and all contract rights, claims, receivables, revenues, 
recoupment rights, recovery rights, accounting adjustments, mispayments, 
erroneous payments or other claims of any nature in favor of seller and 
relating to and accruing any time period before the Effective Date; (b) any 
accounts receivable or payable accruing before the Effective Date; (c) all 
corporate, partnership, financial, tax and legal records of seller, other than 
title; (d) all hydrocarbon production from or attributable to the Properties 
with respect to all periods before the Effective Date, and all proceeds 
attributable thereto; (e) all claims for refunds of costs, taxes or expenses 
borne by seller attributable to the period before the Effective Date; (f) all 
deposits, cash, checks, funds and accounts receivable or received 
attributable to seller’s interests in the Properties with respect to any period 
of time before the Effective Date; (g) all computer or communications 
equipment and software or intellectual property—including tapes, data 
and program documentation, and all tangible manifestations and technical 
information relating thereto and the GEPX Accounting System—owned, 
licensed, or used by seller, except that purchaser shall be entitled to receive 
data related to accounting with third parties as specified in the agreement; 
(h) any logo, service mark, copyright, trade name, or trademark of or 
associated with seller or any affiliate of seller or any business of seller or 
an affiliate; (i) all interpreted geological and geophysical data that cannot 
be transferred without the consent of or payment to any third party; (j) all 
vehicles and vessels; and (k) any documents withheld or not transferred 
pursuant to the agreement, including any files, records, information, or 
data to the extent that seller is prevented from disclosing or transferring 
such property to purchaser. 
The import and effect of the “Excluded Assets” provision of a PSA 
was at issue in a case arising out of Texas.156 That case involved oil and 
gas assets located on the Outer Continental Shelf, situated off of the coast 
of California.157 Plains successfully sued the Federal government after it 
repudiated certain leases, with Plains recovering more than $83 million.158 
In this case, the court explained the factual underpinning of the suit, 
as follows: 
At issue is the proper construction of a 1996 purchase and sale 
agreement in which Torch Energy Advisors Inc. sold its leasehold 
                                                                                                             
 156. Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc., No. 13–
0597, 2015 WL 3653330, at *5 (Tex. June 12, 2015). 
 157. Id. at *1–2. 
 158. Id. at *4. 
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interests in undeveloped oil and gas fields located outside territorial 
waters off the coast of California. Certain tangible and intangible 
interests were excluded from the conveyance on terms described in 
the purchase and sale agreement. More than a decade later, a federal 
court determined that the federal government had repudiated the 
mineral leases because a statute enacted several years before the 
conveyance had later been applied in a manner that precluded 
development of the leasehold interests. As a result, the purchaser’s 
successor in interest, Plains Exploration & Production Company, 
was awarded restitution of the lease-bonus payments Torch’s 
predecessor had paid to secure the leases. Although not a party to 
the litigation, Torch claimed an ownership interest in roughly half 
the judgment based on the terms of the excluded-assets provision in 
the 1996 agreement. When Plains declined to pay, Torch sued, 
alleging various contract, tort, and equitable theories of recovery.159 
Torch contended that it was entitled to share in Plains’ recovery because 
the monies so obtained allegedly came within the ambit of an “Excluded 
Asset” retained by Torch in the 1996 PSA.160 The clause on which Torch 
relied read, as follows: 
§ 1.2. Excluded Assets. As used herein, “Excluded Assets” means . . . 
(b) all claims and causes of action of [Torch] (i) arising from acts, 
omissions or events, or damage to or destruction of property, occurring 
prior to the Effective Date, (ii) arising under or with respect to any of 
the Contracts that are attributable to periods of time prior to the 
Effective Date (including claims for adjustments or refunds); . . . (g) all 
proceeds, income or revenues (and any security or other deposits 
made) attributable to (i) the Properties for any period prior to the 
Effective Date, or (ii) any Excluded Assets . . . .161 
Torch argued that “these provisions reserve any future benefit of 
monies spent or actions taken pre-conveyance with respect to the leases, 
while the contract otherwise conveyed all future production benefits to 
Plains.”162 Rejecting this contention, the court held as follows: 
Viewing the contract as reserving, in perpetuity, any claim, cause 
of action, or resulting judgment that could ever be asserted under 
                                                                                                             
 159. Id. at *1. 
 160. Id. at *5. 
 161. Id. at *6 (quoting the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between the parties 
to the lawsuit). 
 162. Id. at *9. 
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laws in existence at the time of the conveyance is not a reasonable 
construction of the excluded-assets provision.  
Because the proceeds of the Amber judgment are neither attributable 
to nor arising from or with respect to pre-conveyance events, they are 
not excluded assets within the meaning of sections 1.2(b)(i), 
1.2(b)(ii), and 1.2(g) of the 1996 PSA. Torch therefore has no claim 
to any portion of the judgment.163 
The “take-away” from this case is that great care must be taken in 
defining terms employed in the PSA and in understanding the import and 
interplay between these terms. 
2. Preliminary Purchase Price 
The parties will stipulate the base, or preliminary, purchase price to be 
paid by the purchaser for the assets being sold by the seller. This statement 
of monetary consideration is necessarily preliminary because it is subject 
to adjustment, either upward or downward, depending on a variety of 
reasons, all specified in the parties’ agreement.164 Starting with the 
Preliminary Purchase Price, the process that the PSA envisions should 
conclude with a fixed and determined Final Purchase Price, thus satisfying 
the codal requirement that the “price must be fixed by the parties in a sum 
either certain or determinable through a method agreed by them.”165 
3. Deposit 
Depending on a variety of issues—not the least of which is the 
magnitude of the transaction in terms of the amount of the purchase price, 
as well the prior history between the parties—the PSA may require that 
the purchaser post a deposit, perhaps 10% of the purchase price, to ensure 
the purchaser’s performance under the agreement. The disposition of the 
deposit should be addressed in the PSA, both as to the circumstance when 
the closing occurs or does not occur. 
The concept of earnest money has been held applicable to a transaction 
involving oil and gas leases.166 The default nature of a deposit under 
Louisiana law, however, has changed since the repeal of Louisiana Civil 
                                                                                                             
 163. Id. at *11. 
 164. For a discussion of the circumstances giving rise to an adjustment of the 
purchase price, see supra Part IV.B.4. 
 165. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2464 (2015). 
 166. See Baird v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 947, 949 (W.D. La. 1933), aff’d, 
65 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1933). 
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Code article 2463,167 which provided: “[I]f the promise to sell has been 
made with the giving of earnest, each of the contracting parties is at liberty 
to recede from the promise; to wit: he who has given the earnest, by 
forfeiting it; and he who has received it, by returning the double.”168 Under 
this law, money given as a deposit in connection with an agreement to 
purchase and sell property was presumed to constitute earnest money 
unless the parties negated the agreement being regarded as such.169 This 
treatment of a deposit in connection with a contract to sell necessitated an 
express statement that the money would not be “deemed” as earnest 
money.170 
Effective January 1, 1995, the provision concerning “earnest money” 
is governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2624, which establishes the 
opposite presumption regarding deposits: “A sum given by the buyer to 
the seller in connection with a contract to sell is regarded to be a deposit 
on account of the price, unless the parties have expressly provided 
otherwise.”171 Thus, under the new law, parties must stipulate that a sum 
given to the seller is earnest money, in which case “either party may recede 
from the contract, but the buyer who chooses to recede must forfeit the 
earnest money, and the seller who so chooses must return the earnest 
money plus an equal amount.”172 Further, article 2624 makes clear that 
“[w]hen earnest money has been given and a party fails to perform for 
reasons other than a fortuitous event, that party will be regarded as 
receding from the contract.”173 
4. Purchase Price Adjustments 
It is also important to consider the conduct of “due diligence,” a 
procedure or activity that affords the purchaser the opportunity to satisfy 
itself that the seller validly owns what it states that it owns and that the 
purchaser will be acquiring those assets that it intends to acquire for the 
price to which the parties have agreed. If the conduct of due diligence 
identifies defects in the title of the Assets, the environmental condition of 
the property, or otherwise as contemplated by the PSA, the agreement 
typically affords an opportunity to either terminate the agreement or adjust 
the purchase price. 
                                                                                                             
 167. Act No. 841, 1993 La. Acts 2239. 
 168. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2463 (1992). 
 169. Smith v. Hussey, 43 So. 902, 904–05 (La. 1907). 
 170. See id. 
 171. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2624 (2015). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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One published report elucidates on the issue of the frequency of a 
Purchase Price Adjustment resulting from the conduct of due diligence as 
follows: 
The November 2014 study from the David Eccles School of 
Business at The University of Utah — Title Clean-Up Analysis 
(by K. Bown, M. Dixon, J. Ingebritson and K. Rodriguez) — 
analyzed approximately 5,600 leases and deeds from two fairly 
large lease deals with dozens of predecessors. The four-person 
research team expected the data to show that the net gains and 
losses in acreage from title defects would even out. What they 
discovered instead is that title defects are two times more likely to 
result in a net loss than in a net gain in acreage. In their analysis 
of 145 additional public transactions, the team revealed a lack of 
organization, transparency, and accountability across the industry. 
Of those 145 transactions, 48 listed both the original announced 
price and the price at closing. Of those 48, one-half (23) had a 
different price at closing.174 
Many PSAs utilize a defined term “Defensible Title.” As that term is 
not one typically used in the civil law, parties contracting in Louisiana 
should change “Defensible Title” to “Merchantable Title,” or even 
“Marketable Title.”175 This defined term embodies the standard against 
which the quality and sufficiency of the title of the seller is to be evaluated, 
                                                                                                             
 174. Mikal E. Belicove, Taking the Guesswork Out of Oil and Gas Lease 
Contracts, HART ENERGY (Feb. 12, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.oilandgasinvest 
or.com/blog/taking-guesswork-out-oil-and-gas-lease-contracts-782881. 
 175. “Property has a merchantable title when it can be readily sold or 
mortgaged in the ordinary course of business by reasonable persons familiar with 
the facts and questions involved.” Young v. Stevens, 209 So. 2d 25, 27 (La. 1967); 
accord Parker v. Machen, 567 So. 2d 739, 743 (La. Ct. App. 1990). Title is 
unmerchantable when it is suggestive of litigation. See Hardtner v. Dixie Oil Co., 
113 So. 357, 358–59 (La. 1927). “The word ‘merchantable’ implies something 
less than a perfect title and permits of defects which are not reasonably liable to 
result in assault.” Langford Land Co. v. Dietzgen Corp., 352 So. 2d 386, 388 (La. 
Ct. App. 1977) (quoting Roberts v. Medlock, 148 So. 474, 476 (La. Ct. App. 
1933)); see also Schaub v. O’Quin, 38 So. 2d 63, 65 (La. 1948) (“The 
purchaser . . . is entitled to receive a complete, valid, unclouded title; he cannot 
be compelled to accept a title burdened with a claim having a substantial basis 
and, therefore, which is suggestive of serious future litigation; his agreement 
provided for the purchase only of the property, not the property plus a probable 
law suit.”).  
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particularly as to the quantification of the interests as represented by the 
seller in the PSA. 
If the conduct of title due diligence reveals any discrepancy in either 
the Working Interest (“WI”) or Net Revenue Interest (“NRI”) as 
represented by the seller, or other insufficiency in title, the question then 
presented is whether it meets the definition of a “title defect” as articulated 
in the PSA.176  
If the due diligence conducted by the purchaser’s team discovers a 
discrepancy that is in the favor of the seller, in that the calculated WI or 
NRI is higher than the represented WI or NRI, that is a “title benefit” and 
is subject to being declared to the seller in the same manner as a title defect. 
An upward variance in the calculated decimal interest is a “title benefit,” 
inuring to the benefit of the seller in that it increases its WI or NRI, 
potentially leading to an increase in the purchase price.  
Usually, any downward variance in the calculated decimal interest as 
found by the due diligence effort, as contrasted with the represented 
numbers, will meet the definition of “title defect.”177 Typically, a matter 
would not be deemed to constitute a title defect if it is covered by the 
definition of another defined term, such as “Permitted Liens” or “Permitted 
Encumbrances.”178 An abbreviated listing of matters residing under the 
ambit of the term employed in the PSA might include the following: 
(a) defects or irregularities arising out of lack of corporate 
authorization, or a variation in corporate name, unless Purchaser 
provides affirmative evidence that such corporate action was not 
authorized and results in another person’s superior claim of title to 
the relevant Property;  
                                                                                                             
 176. WI is the undivided interest owned by a person or company in and to a 
mineral lease. Costs and expenses of operation of a well are borne by the owners 
of the working interest in and to the mineral lease on which the well is drilled, or 
in the unit in which such well is located, in accordance with their respective 
working interest. NRI is the proportionate part of revenue attributable to the WI, 
after considering and excluded the royalty interest held by others. 
 177. As will be seen, however, that conclusion does not necessarily mean that 
the defect is one that can be asserted. 
 178. Although it is common for a PSA to refer to “Permitted Liens,” properly 
speaking, Louisiana law does not recognize the institution of “lien.” Rather, in the 
Bayou State’s civil law, it is denominated as “privilege.” See Succession of 
Benjamin, 2 So. 187, 188 (La. 1887) (“The term ‘lien’ is not used in our law as 
significative of any particular sort of incumbrance. It is a legal term used generally 
to signify any incumbrance on property, but, we may say, usually employed in 
connection with privileges, and rarely with mortgages.”). 
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(b) defects or irregularities that have been cured or remedied by 
applicable statutes of limitation or statutes for prescription;  
(c) defects or irregularities in the chain of title consisting of the 
failure to recite marital status in documents or omissions of 
heirship proceedings;  
(d) defects or irregularities in title that, for a period of five years 
or more, have not delayed or prevented Seller [or Seller’s 
predecessor, if owned by Seller less than five years] from 
receiving its Net Revenue Interest share of the proceeds of 
production, or caused it to bear a share of expenses and costs 
greater than its Working Interest share from any unit or well;  
(e) defects or irregularities resulting from or related to probate 
proceedings, or the lack thereof, which defects or irregularities 
have been outstanding for five years or more;  
(f) conventional rights of reassignment normally activated by an 
intent to abandon or release a lease and requiring notice to the 
holders of such rights, and any other defect or irregularity as 
would normally be waived by persons engaged in the oil and gas 
business when purchasing producing properties; 
(g) lessor’s royalties, non-participating royalties, overriding 
royalties, reversionary interests, and similar burdens upon, 
measured by, or payable out of production if the net cumulative 
effect of such burdens does not operate to reduce the Net 
Revenue Interest of Seller in any well or unit to an amount less 
than the Net Revenue Interest set forth on Schedule I for such 
well or unit, and does not obligate Seller to bear a Working 
Interest for such well or unit in any amount greater than the 
Working Interest set forth on Schedule I for such well or unit 
unless the Net Revenue Interest for such well or unit is greater 
than the Net Revenue Interest set forth on Schedule I in the same 
proportion as any increase in such Working Interest;179 
(h) all applicable laws, and rights reserved to or vested in any 
governmental authority (i) to control or regulate any Property in 
any manner; (ii) by the terms of any right, power, franchise, grant, 
license, or permit, or by any provision of law, to terminate such 
right, power, franchise, grant, license, or permit; to purchase, 
condemn, expropriate, or recapture; or to designate a purchaser of 
                                                                                                             
 179. It is customary to attach to the PSA a schedule or exhibit that identifies 
the leases or wells being sold and setting forth the WI and NRI for each identified 
property. If the represented WI or NRI is subject to potential change (increase or 
decrease) because of any circumstance (e.g., a future “payout” event), that is also 
reflected in the interest of disclosure and understanding. 
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any Property; (iii) to use such Property in a manner that does not 
materially impair the use of such Property for the purposes for 
which it is currently owned and operated; and (iv) to enforce any 
obligations or duties affecting any Property to any governmental 
authority, with respect to any franchise, grant, license, or permit; 
(i) rights of a common owner of any interest in rights-of-way or 
easements currently held by Seller and such common owner as 
tenants in common or through common ownership; 
(j) easements, conditions, covenants, restrictions, servitudes, 
permits, rights-of-way, surface leases and other rights in the 
Properties, for the purpose of surface operations, roads, alleys, 
highways, railways, pipelines, transmission lines, transportation 
lines, distribution lines, power lines, telephone lines, removal of 
timber, grazing, logging operations, canals, ditches, reservoirs, 
and other like purposes, or for the joint or common use of real 
estate, rights-of-way, facilities, and equipment that do not 
materially impair the use, ownership, or operation of the 
Properties as currently owned and operated; 
(k) zoning and planning ordinances and municipal regulations; 
(l) any encumbrance affecting the Properties that is discharged by 
Seller at or prior to Closing; and 
(m) the Leases, the Basic Documents, and all other liens, privileges, 
charges, encumbrances, contracts, agreements, instruments, 
obligations, defects, and irregularities affecting the Properties that 
individually or in the aggregate are not such as to materially 
interfere with the ownership, operation, or use of any of the 
Properties as currently owned and operated, and do not reduce the 
Net Revenue Interest of Seller in any well or unit to an amount 
less than the Net Revenue Interest set forth on Schedule I for such 
well or unit and do not obligate Seller to bear a Working Interest 
for such well or unit in any amount greater than the Working 
Interest set forth on Schedule I for such well or unit unless the Net 
Revenue Interest for such Property is greater than the Net Revenue 
Interest set forth on Schedule I in the same proportion as any 
increase in such Working Interest. 
The purchaser should carefully scrutinize the listing of “Permitted Liens” 
as proposed by the seller and endeavor to eliminate those matters that 
represent a risk that the purchaser is unwilling to assume. 
Conversely, it is in the seller’s best interest to “load up” the 
enumerated matters so that the purchaser cannot assert these circumstances 
as a title defect at a later date. Indeed, if the seller is aware of a particular 
matter that is arguably a title defect, but the issue has been lingering for a 
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significant period of time without complaint, the seller will deem it 
reasonable to let that sleeping dog lie, and avoid any possibility of 
awakening that sleeping dog. By listing it as a “Permitted Lien,” the seller 
is afforded the opportunity to bring the matter to the attention of the 
purchaser before the PSA is signed, with the understanding that the matter 
should be left alone. 
Other defects not involving a variance in the calculated WI or NRI 
could also be asserted as a title defect, if they meet the contractual 
definition of that term. Examples would be a mineral lease affecting 
community property that has been signed by one spouse only; subject to a 
superior mortgage, which has not been subordinated; executed by a 
succession representative for which court authority was not perfectly 
obtained; for which an assignment from a prior record owner to the current 
seller is unavailable, and so on. These illustrations are title defects and, 
unless such defects are cured, they will negatively affect the calculation of 
the WI and NRI. As a result, full realization of the WI and NRI as 
represented by the seller in the PSA cannot be achieved.  
The end product of the title due diligence effort is to declare or assert 
these defects on or before the “Title Defect Notice Date,” as specified in 
the PSA. This date is typically a reasonable number of days before the 
closing date to afford a period of time for the seller to evaluate the asserted 
title defect and either undertake to cure the defect or otherwise resolve it 
as specified in the PSA. 
The title defect notice typically requires certain specified information, 
such as the following: (a) a description of the Asserted Defect and the 
wells and/or units listed on Schedule I to which it relates, and all 
supporting documentation reasonably necessary to fully describe the basis 
for the Defect or, if the supporting documentation is contained in Seller’s 
Files, sufficient information to enable Seller to expeditiously locate such 
supporting documentation; (b) for each applicable well or unit, the size of 
any variance from WI or NRI, which does or could result from such 
Asserted Defect; and (c) the amount by which Purchaser would propose to 
adjust the Base Purchase Price, which amount shall not exceed the 
Allocated Amount of the Properties affected by such Asserted Defect. 
Despite that a number of title defects have been identified as meeting 
the definition of “title defect,” the agreement might specify either a “floor” 
or a “ceiling” that must first be met before these defects can be validly 
asserted. It might be provided that, for an identified defect to be 
considered, it must meet a certain monetary threshold, typically called a 
“basket.” For example, the agreement might provide that a defect having 
a value of less than $50,000—or any other threshold amount to which the 
parties might agree—is not to be considered. At the same time, the PSA 
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may contemplate that otherwise eligible title defects will not be taken into 
account unless and until, in the aggregate, the defects equal or exceed a 
certain “threshold,” often stated as a percentage of the total preliminary 
purchase price. An example of such a clause might read: 
Notwithstanding the provisions set forth above, a Title Defect or 
Title Benefit shall not result in an adjustment in the Preliminary 
Purchase Price unless the aggregate net value of all Title Defects 
and Title Benefits with respect to the Interests claimed by the 
parties is greater than five percent (5%) of the Preliminary 
Purchase Price (the “Threshold Amount”). In such event, the 
Preliminary Purchase Price on the Closing shall be adjusted by the 
aggregate net value of all Title Defects or Title Benefits. 
Clarity can also be brought to this issue by a clause that might read, as 
follows: 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Base 
Purchase Price shall not be reduced pursuant to this Section, 
unless and until the aggregate of all such reductions exceeds five 
percent (5%) of the Base Purchase Price (which amount shall be a 
threshold, not a deductible). 
Care should be taken that the seller has no opportunity to “double dip,” 
by effectuating a de minimis basket or threshold as well as a deductible. 
By the same token, the defect amount asserted by a purchaser should be 
regulated by a clause that provides that “any allowable defect amount shall 
be determined and calculated without duplication of any cost or loss 
asserted by way of any other allowable defect amount pertaining to the 
same property.” Otherwise, one party or the other would be availing a 
contractual right on a duplicative basis, resulting in an inequitable 
adjustment upward or downward on the purchase price. 
Upon timely receipt of notice of title defects meeting the threshold, if 
any, the seller typically has a few options. Generally, at the election of the 
seller, the PSA might provide that the seller can cure the defect, postpone 
the closing, proceed to close while holding back the asset subject to the 
asserted defect with a consequential reduction of the purchase price, or 
terminate the agreement. 
A downward adjustment to the purchase price—inuring to the benefit 
of the purchaser—might arise for a variety of reasons. The amount of any 
title defects, environmental defects, or the elimination of an asset by 
reason of the exercise by a third party of a “pref right,” are the most typical 
examples. A downward adjustment can also result from gas imbalances 
for which the purchaser will have responsibility in the future. The purchase 
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price might also be reduced by other circumstances to which the parties 
agree in writing. 
On the other hand, the purchase price might be increased by reason of 
a title benefit discovered during the conduct of title due diligence. Also, 
an upward adjustment might be caused by capital expenditures incurred 
by the seller, but pertaining to activities conducted after the effective date 
of the sale, and, thus, for which the purchaser would be responsible. 
An adjustment, either upward or downward, might arise by reason of 
the value of production revenues received by one party or the other, but 
attributable to production accruing to the other party in reference to the 
effective date of the transaction. A case in point can be found on reports 
that Chesapeake filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which are available for public viewing.180 There, a disclosure is made as 
to a PSA pertaining to the sale by Chesapeake to Southwestern Energy of 
assets in the Marcellus and Utica Formations in Wetzel County, West 
Virginia.181 The PSA reflected a purchase price greater than $5 million.182 
Seemingly, a dispute arose as to the sufficiency or adequacy of title, and 
resulted in a settlement of such matters in the amount of $400 billion by 
way of a reduction of the purchase price.183 
C. Due Diligence 
A critical aspect of the purchase and sale of producing properties is 
the conduct of due diligence. Long gone are the days—if they ever 
existed—when caveat emptor was the prevailing model.184 Due diligence 
refers to the conduct of such investigation and inspection of the assets as 
is necessary or appropriate to allow the purchaser to become fully familiar 
with the quality and sufficiency of the assets involved, and as to the range 
of obligations inherent therein. The term “due diligence” is actually derived 
from a provision in the Securities Act of 1933, which afforded a defense to 
broker-dealers who were charged with inadequate or insufficient disclosure 
to potential purchasers of offered securities.185 This important topic has 
                                                                                                             
 180. See Chesapeake Energy Corporation Annual Report [SEC Form 10-K] 
(2014), available at https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:CHK/sec. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. “Caveat emptor” means “let the buyer beware” in Latin. It connotes that 
the seller is assuming no responsibility for the quality or sufficiency of its title, 
leaving the matter to the buyer to satisfy itself with respect to such matters. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 252 (9th ed. 2009). 
 185. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2014). 
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been the subject of excellent articles presented at the Institute on Mineral 
Law.186 
1. Purpose and Objective 
The seller—and the purchaser, for that matter—in a PSA customarily 
make certain representations and warranties, called by way of short hand 
“reps and warranties.” Among these “reps and warranties” might be a 
number of representations to the effect that the seller owns, perhaps 
subject only to “Permitted Liens” or “Permitted Encumbrances,”187 the 
working interest and net revenue interest set forth on a schedule to the 
PSA. The question might be asked as to why these explicit representations 
are not sufficient, and why, in view thereof, it is necessary to conduct due 
diligence. 
There are a number of reasons why the purchaser should not rely 
solely on the seller’s “reps and warranties.” First, unless a robust due 
diligence is undertaken, the purchaser is essentially taking the assets at 
“face value,” on a caveat emptor or “as is” basis, without the knowledge 
of particular defects or deficiencies that if known in advance of the 
execution of a PSA, would lead to a refinement or expansion of “reps and 
warranties” that the purchaser might seek to obtain from the seller. Next, 
the “reps and warranties” of the seller are often qualified by a knowledge 
qualifier—“to the best of seller’s knowledge”—or are limited, by 
provisions in the PSA, as to the manner of enforcement of a claim for 
breach of warranty. Some forms of PSA provide: “None of the 
representations and warranties contained in this Agreement, or in any 
certificate delivered at Closing shall survive the Closing and the delivery 
of the Conveyance.” In lieu of this limitation, the PSA might provide that 
the “reps and warranties” only survive for a stated period of time, even as 
short as six months. Additionally, accepting the seller’s “reps and 
warranties” as a sole basis to be comfortable as to title affords no 
opportunity to adjust the purchase price based upon any discrepancy in the 
WI and NRI numbers represented by the seller. Finally, by purchasing the 
properties without the conduct of a robust due diligence, a purchaser 
should always be concerned about the future ability of the seller to respond 
to an indemnity demand based upon a title discrepancy discovered post-
closing, particularly many years later. These reasons and others establish 
                                                                                                             
 186. See, e.g., Janin H. Jones & Mark E. Robinson, Due Diligence for the 90s 
from the Land and Legal Perspectives, 42 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 1 (1995); Aaron 
G. Carlson, Due Diligence in Oil and Gas Acquisitions, 54 ANN. INST. ON MIN. 
L. 83 (2007). 
 187. See supra Part IV.B.4. 
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that the conduct of a comprehensive due diligence effort is the prudent 
course of action for the purchaser. 
The due diligence that is typically conducted is performed by employees, 
as well as outside landmen, abstracters, and other consultants. Once the due 
diligence team is assembled, the next issue is to determine the manner in 
which access to the seller’s records will be allowed. It is typical that, among 
other covenants or undertakings made by the seller, it will covenant to 
provide access to the business records for purposes of the conduct by the 
purchaser of due diligence. Such access also is regulated by notions of 
reasonableness, during business hours, and perhaps with a stated amount 
of advance notice. 
The seller might elect to place all relevant documents and files in a 
“data room,” so as to control the review process, and thereby avoid a 
“stranger” from “roaming” through its files. More currently, the practice 
is to scan all records, and provide access in a “lock box” or virtual space, 
via an assigned password. The “old fashioned” way is to permit the 
purchaser’s team of landmen and other consultants to visit the office of the 
seller and examine the relevant documents.  
Due diligence basically falls into three principal categories: title, 
environmental, and regulatory. Other investigatory efforts residing under 
the moniker of due diligence would pertain to an examination of financial, 
litigation, contractual, and insurance matters. 
2. Title Due Diligence 
In a sense, the prudence of conducting title due diligence is 
reminiscent of that sage observation uttered by Hedley Lamarr—played 
by Harvey Korman—in the classic movie, Blazing Saddles.188 This villain 
planned to buy up land and resell it to the railroad.189 “Unfortunately,” he 
says, “there is one thing standing between me and that property—the 
rightful owners.”190 Due diligence has as its purpose, if anything, a 
determination or confirmation that the seller is in fact the “rightful owner” 
of the assets the PSA embraces. 
To this end, the seller typically will attach to the PSA a schedule that 
lists the assets to be conveyed, and sets forth a representation by the seller 
of the working interest and net revenue interest associated with each 
distinct property. The purchaser then allocates a portion of the total 
purchase price to the properties described on the schedule of assets. 
Although the purchaser typically undertakes to allocate the initial values, 
                                                                                                             
 188. BLAZING SADDLES (Warner Bros. 1974). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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carefully scrutinizing the values so assigned is in the interest of both 
parties, as these allocated values have the potential to either increase or 
decrease the purchase price in some instances. 
Indeed, the allocation of the total purchase price serves two fundamental 
purposes. First, in the event that a party holding a preferential right to 
purchase as to a particular asset should exercise such right, the value 
allocated to that property would fix the price to be paid by the “pref right” 
holder, and the purchase price would be accordingly reduced. Next, in the 
event of a title defect or title benefit, the purchase price would be adjusted 
downward—in the event of a title defect—or upward—in the case of a title 
benefit—based on the formula in the PSA. 
Typically, the WI and NRI, which are set forth on a schedule and 
constitute an express representation by the seller, relate to an identified 
well or unit. Generally, the represented numbers are not broken out on a 
lease-by-lease basis. This manner of attribution causes issues of translation 
in that, by definition, working interest and net revenue are associated with 
distinct mineral leases and, in the case of unit production, the numbers are 
then aggregated to the unit or the well to which such mineral leases relate.  
This means that, as a minimum, the due diligence team needs a copy 
of all mineral leases and amendments, as well as any instruments creating 
additional burdens on production affecting the subject leases, such as the 
unit survey plat, and information from the Office of Conservation 
confirming that the unit well is in fact perforated within the unitized 
interval.  
Additionally, the due diligence team would like to gain comfort from 
reviewing division orders, if they exist, and royalty checks to show the 
manner in which the royalties have been historically distributed by the 
operator. With respect to the WI being conveyed, the team would want to 
view JIB statements191 to confirm that the operator consistently recognized 
the cost-bearing responsibility of the seller. 
Also inherent in the title due diligence is the issue of “lease 
maintenance,” that is, confirming that the mineral leases have, in fact, been 
maintained in force and effect to a current date. This necessitates a review 
of cancelled checks representing the payment of delay rentals, and 
royalties. These lease payments constitute “rent,”192 and the failure to pay 
such payments, or the improper payment thereof, would either result in the 
termination of the lease—with respect to the nonpayment of delay 
                                                                                                             
 191. A “JIB statement” is a “joint interest billing statement,” which reflects 
the percentage or decimal responsibility of each WI owner for costs in the unit or 
lease in question. 
 192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:123 (2000). 
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rentals193—or the potential for lease dissolution or double royalties as 
damages (as pertains to the nonpayment of royalties).194 This type of 
historic information is not always available, particularly if the assets are 
represented by mineral leases that are many years old.  
Typically, the PSA includes a lease schedule, which lists all mineral 
leases subject to the transaction. If the schedule indicates that any one or 
more leases are limited as to subsurface depth—say, the lease is shown to 
cover only “shallow rights,” or “deep rights” under the leased premises—
the title due diligence must at a minimum determine that the lease only 
covers those depths. The purchaser must check whether seller is proposing 
to convey the entirety of the interest covered by the mineral lease, or if 
some third person owns—or perhaps the seller itself intends to reserve—
the non-described subsurface depth. If the mineral lease is determined to 
cover all subsurface depth, but only the “shallow rights” or the “deep 
rights” are being conveyed, inquiry should be made into the possibility 
that the mineral lease has been or will be divided—a critical issue that 
directly implicates lease maintenance.195 
The due diligence team will also review the seller’s lease files to 
discern if any demand by the lessor to correct an alleged breach of the 
mineral leases has been or is currently pending, and how any such demand 
or claim of breach has been resolved. It would not be usual that there is 
ample time to obtain full abstracts of title covering title to the lands 
affected by the mineral leases that are the subject to the transaction. 
Typically, the due diligence team will attempt to identify and obtain any 
existing title opinions and bring them current with respect to the interest 
being conveyed. This is accomplished by sending abstracters or brokers to 
the pertinent courthouses to examine the public records from the closing 
date of any existing and available title opinions or abstracts to a current 
date.  
In that regard, one does not ordinarily “look behind” the title opinion, 
nor spend any time or money in bringing them current with respect to an 
interest not being purchased. The constraints of time usually disallow any 
opportunity to verify all findings in the title opinion. Since the operator 
has relied upon the findings of such opinions, presumably without 
                                                                                                             
 193. Id. at § 31:133. 
 194. Id. at §§ 31:137 to :142. 
 195. See generally Ottinger, What’s in a Name?, supra note 53. As a general 
proposition, “lease division,” when it is presented, means that activities that would 
maintain in force and effect one of the mineral leases, “would not result in the 
perpetuation of the second lease because, in essence, they are now separate and 
distinct leases, albeit each being regulated under the same contractual terms as 
specified in the original lease document.” Id. at 309. 
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complaint, relying on the findings of the opinion as expressed is 
commercially reasonable. Reviewing each unsatisfied title opinion 
requirement is necessary, however, to evaluate whether curative actions 
are appropriate.196 
With this information, the lawyer will examine the documentation 
provided, in an attempt to verify the accuracy of the WI and NRI numbers 
represented by the seller. If there is a discrepancy, it is to be identified, and 
the lawyer should attempt to frame curative requirements, that is, those 
actions that, if taken, will cure or rectify the discrepancy. If the 
discrepancy cannot be clarified, it might give rise to a purchase price 
adjustment or some other mode of resolution.  
As critical as a review of the conveyance records is to the important 
purpose of verifying that the interests owned by the seller have not been 
alienated, examining the mortgage records to confirm that the seller’s 
properties are not subject to any mortgage or privilege is equally as 
important. Clearly, if that is the case, the purchaser will not want to acquire 
the interests and then be subject to losing them at a judicial sale.  
Purely as a practical matter, if a property has been producing for a 
great period of time without complaint, and if nothing is revealed in an 
examination of the seller’s files that suggests a precarious or tenuous 
relationship with the lessor, some comfort might be gained from such fact 
under the well-known theory of the “sleeping dog.” 
Beyond the issue of title—as important as that is—the due diligence 
team will endeavor to identify any restrictions on assignability or 
preferential rights to purchase. The ability on the part of the seller to 
convey the assets without restriction is directly contingent on a 
confirmation that no such restrictions exist. If these restrictions exist, 
abiding by the relevant provision, and then either seeking to obtain the 
requisite consent or approval or a waiver, is necessary.197  
A seller can be determined to have perfect title to the assets that are 
subject to the PSA, but that determination is of little comfort if the seller 
is not a validly created legal entity, lacking the capacity to own or convey 
title.198 Thus, a subset of the title due diligence is confirmation that the 
seller is a validly created legal entity in good standing with its state of 
incorporation or organization, and of the state in which the assets are 
located. 
                                                                                                             
 196. Further comfort might be gained by the mere passage of time, in reliance 
on principles of acquisitive prescription.  
 197. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:126 to :128 (2000). 
 198. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 479 (2015). 
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3. Environmental Due Diligence 
In recent years, the topic of the environmental condition of the property 
has become an issue of paramount interest to the purchaser. This is 
particularly so if the agreement envisions that the purchaser must undertake 
remediation efforts or indemnify the seller in reference to the condition of 
the lands covered by leases. 
a. Scope 
Since the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Corbello v. Iowa 
Production,199 and the spate of litigation resulting therefrom, it is imperative 
that the purchaser conduct at least a cursory inspection of the property, as 
well as the records of the seller, to ascertain that the environmental condition 
of the property is not such as to result in a lawsuit seeking damages for 
failure to remediate the land.200 
A site visit by engineers and consultants is essential to clearly 
understand the nature, placement, configuration, and condition of 
equipment located on the property. This important effort constitutes an 
environmental site assessment (“ESA”), and these studies are categorized in 
“phases.”201  
More specifically, a Phase I ESA is the more superficial, and does not 
typically entail actual sampling of soil, air, or groundwater.202 The more 
intrusive ESA is the Phase II ESA, which actually involves the collection 
and analysis of soil and groundwater samples.203 The Environmental 
Protection Agency has promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to these 
investigations, matters that, although of critical importance, are beyond the 
scope of this paper.204 
                                                                                                             
 199. 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003), reh’g granted in part, 850 So. 2d 714 (La. 
2003); see also Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 851 So. 2d 1253 (La. Ct. App. 2003) 
(judgment rendered on remand). 
 200. See Susan G. Zachos & Brenda L. Clayton, State of the Art of Negotiating 
Environmental Issues in Energy Industry Purchase and Sale Agreements, 55 INST. 
ON OIL & GAS L. 13-1 (2004). 
 201. See Charles P. Efflandt, When the Tail Wags the Dog: Environmental 
Considerations and Strategies in Business Acquisitions, Sales and Merger 
Transactions, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 28, 43–44 (1999). 
 202. Id. at 43. 
 203. Id. at 44. 
 204. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 302–307 (2003). 
2016] CLOSING THE DEAL IN THE BAYOU STATE 741 
 
 
 
b. Regulatory Requirement 
If any of these types of investigation are conducted, the parties must be 
mindful of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29.1, which provides as 
follows: 
If the owner or operator of any oilfield site or exploration and 
production (E&P) site covered by the provisions of R.S. 30:29 
performs any environmental testing on land owned by another 
person, results of such environmental testing shall be provided to 
the owner or owners of the land within ten days from receipt of 
such results by the owner or operator, regardless of whether or not 
suit has been filed by the owner or owners of the land. The 
operator or owner or owners of land or anyone acting on their 
behalf who perform any environmental testing on land that is an 
oilfield or exploration and production (E&P) site shall provide the 
results of such testing to the department within ten days of 
receipt.205 
A variety of consulting firms might be contracted for this purpose. The 
seller probably will insist that the purchaser assume all responsibilities to 
remediate the property, and plug and abandon the wells. In contrast, the 
purchaser will want to know the potential scope of this responsibility in 
financial terms as best as they can be ascertained or estimated. 
c. Site-Specific Trust Agreements 
Additionally, major issues between parties to a sale of producing 
properties include the environmental condition of the property, the 
potential for future regulatory action by the Louisiana Office of 
Conservation relative to the remediation of the property, and the plugging 
and abandonment of inactive wells.206 As a general proposition, the 
Commissioner of Conservation will seek enforcement against the current 
operator of record.207 It has long been the policy of the Office of 
Conservation, however, to seek enforcement against a prior owner or 
                                                                                                             
 205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29.1 (2007). 
 206. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 101 (2011). For an illustration of the 
problems that can be encountered as a consequence of a failure to properly plug 
and abandon a well, see Magnolia Coal Terminal Co. v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 
2d 475 (La. 1991). 
 207. See J. Patrick Batchelor, Comm’r of Conservation, La. Dep’t of Natural 
Res., Memorandum, Enforcement Policy—Abandoned Wells and Pits (July 24, 
1990). 
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operator in the event the current operator cannot be located or is unable to 
perform the necessary remedial activities.208 
To be sure, the sale and assignment of the assets of which the field is 
composed is no impediment to the Commissioner seeking performance 
from a prior operator.209 Parties to the transfer of an oilfield site210 have the 
opportunity to establish a site-specific trust account (“SSTA”) “for the 
purpose of providing a source of funds for site restoration of that oilfield site 
at such time in the future when restoration of that oilfield is required.”211 To 
establish a site-specific trust account, a contractor approved by the Oilfield 
Site Restoration Commission must conduct an oilfield site restoration 
assessment.212 The parties must fund the account in accordance with a 
funding schedule that the parties proposed and the Commission approved.213  
Once the SSTA is approved and the account is fully funded, the party 
transferring the oilfield site “shall not thereafter be held liable by the state 
for any site restoration costs or actions associated with the transferred 
oilfield site.”214 Instead, “[t]he party acquiring the oilfield site shall 
thereafter be the responsible party.”215 
Although the establishment of a site-specific trust account might 
immunize the seller from regulatory responsibility, that in no manner 
affects the right of the lessor to enforce private contractual rights against 
a former owner. Indeed, the Louisiana Mineral Code unequivocally 
instructs that “[a]n assignor or sublessor is not relieved of his obligations 
or liabilities under a mineral lease unless the lessor has discharged him 
expressly and in writing.”216 
                                                                                                             
 208. See Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 195 (La. 1999). 
 209. See id.  
 210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(5) (2007) (“‘Oilfield site’ or ‘exploration 
and production (E&P) site’ means any location or any portion thereof on which oil 
or gas exploration, development, or production activities have occurred, including 
wells, equipment, tanks, flow lines or impoundments used for the purposes of the 
drilling, workover, production, primary separation, disposal, transportation or 
storage of E&P wastes, crude oil and natural gas processing, transportation or 
storage of a common production stream of crude oil, natural gas, coal seam natural 
gas, or geothermal energy prior to a custody transfer or a sales point. In general, this 
definition would apply to all exploration and production operations located on the 
same lease, unit or field.”). 
 211. Id. § 30:88(A). 
 212. Id. § 30:88(B). 
 213. Id. § 30:88(C). 
 214. Id. § 30:88(F). 
 215. Id. 
 216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:129 (2000). 
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4. Regulatory Due Diligence 
The seller might convey to the purchaser perfect title to the assets 
subject to the PSA. Further, there may be no significant environmental 
exposure disclosed by the purchaser’s environmental due diligence. But 
this is of little comfort if the purchaser cannot operate the assets by reason 
of deficiencies in the suite of necessary permits and licenses that the 
operator is, by law, required to hold to lawfully operate the properties. 
Thus, the purchaser should investigate the status of all permits, licenses 
and other permissions that are required by law, whether federal, state, or 
local. 
a. Administrative 
A range of governmental authorities—federal, state, or local—might 
require some sort of permission to hold or operate oil and gas properties. 
At the risk of failing to identify a particular agency or authority, one should 
be mindful of certain commonly encountered issues. If any of the mineral 
leases constituting the assets to be sold is one granted by the State of 
Louisiana, through the State Mineral and Energy Board, it should be 
confirmed that the assignor, as well as the anticipated assignee, is properly 
registered as a “prospective leaseholder.”217 If the assets include leases on 
the Outer Continental Shelf, under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, the purchaser should confirm that the seller—and, 
eventually, the purchaser—is duly qualified to own or hold offshore 
federal leases as required by applicable law.218 Most critically, due 
diligence should verify that all wells are properly and currently authorized 
by proper permits that the Louisiana Office of Conservation issued, and 
that no compliance orders are outstanding or threatened with respect to 
any such wells. 
                                                                                                             
 217. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:127A, :128A (Supp. 2015). 
 218. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012); 30 C.F.R. § 256.35 (2011) (“Mineral leases 
issued pursuant to section 8 of the Act may be held only by: (1) Citizens and 
nationals of the United States, (2) aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20); (3) private, 
public or municipal corporations organized under the laws of the United States or 
of any State or of the District of Columbia or territory thereof, or (4) associations 
of such citizens, nationals, resident aliens, or private, public, or municipal 
corporations, States, or political subdivisions of States.”). 
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b. Regulatory 
If the pertinent assets are geographically located such that they are 
subject to the requirements of the State and Local Coastal Resources 
Management Act of 1978,219 additional inquiries are applicable. Mineral 
activities within the Coastal Zone, “including exploration for, and 
production of, oil, gas, and other minerals, all dredge and fill uses associated 
therewith, and all other associated uses,” constitute a “use of state concern” 
and therefore are subject to the requirements of that regulatory scheme.220 
The precise jurisdictional description of the Coastal Zone is set forth by 
statute221 and on a map or chart available for public inspection in the offices 
of the coastal management program of the Department of Natural Resources 
and each local government in the Coastal Zone.222 But the Coastal Zone 
jurisdiction may generally be considered as all lands lying south of the 
Intracoastal Canal on the Western side of the state and south of Interstate 
Highway 10 on the Eastern side of the state.223 
No person may commence a use of state or local concern without first 
applying for and receiving a coastal use permit.224 The regulations 
pertaining to such applications and permits are quite extensive and have 
been the subject of litigation.225 Efforts should be made to ascertain that all 
necessary permits are in hand relative to any activity in the Coastal Zone. 
A variety of permits are necessary for certain types of equipment that 
might be used in connection with the exploration and production (“E&P”) 
activities of the seller, for which it is necessary to obtain permits for their 
operation. This includes—by way of example only—a permit that 
establishes effluent limitations, prohibitions, reporting requirements, and 
other requirements for discharges associated with oil and gas facilities.226 
Additionally a permit is required to operate facilities that emit pollutants 
into the atmosphere, typically called a “minor source air general 
permit.”227 These permits are transferable upon compliance with notice 
and other requirements by the issuing agency.228 
                                                                                                             
 219. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.21 to :214.42 (2012). 
 220. Id. § 49:214.25. 
 221. Id. § 49:214.24C. 
 222. Id. § 49:214.24D. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. § 49:214.30A(1). 
 225. See, e.g., Pardue v. Stephens, 558 So. 2d 1149 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
 226. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, pt. III, § 513.A.2 (2007). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. pt. I, § 1907. 
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5. Other Areas of Interest in the Conduct of Due Diligence 
Although these categories—title, environmental, and regulatory—are 
important, other topics should be considered, particularly in a large 
transaction. These areas pertain to an examination of financial, litigation, 
contractual, and insurance matters. 
a. Financial 
Under the moniker of financial due diligence, one would be concerned 
with the performance of the producing assets as it relates to the revenue 
stream to the operator from the production historically obtained over a 
previous period of time. This entails a determination as to historic “lifting 
costs,” prices received for the product being produced, existing marketing 
contracts—particularly the term, price, and any provision for price 
redetermination—and whether rates being paid under existing service 
contracts are reasonable and competitive. Additionally, costs of bonds or 
other forms of financial assurance, placed with a regulatory body or 
landowner, or prior owner, must also be identified and understood. Tax 
liabilities for any taxable asset should also be evaluated. The purchaser’s 
chief financial officer, or other employees concerned with financial 
matters, possess the critical skills needed to make these assessments. 
b. Litigation 
The pendency of any litigation affecting an asset should be 
determined. Although this topic is often the subject of a specific 
representation of the seller, the purchaser should “dig deeper” into the 
topic so as to evaluate the potential that it would be joined to the suit, or 
whether an adverse judgment would impede purchaser’s right to enjoy the 
assets that it is purchasing. The purchaser should search the public records, 
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particularly the mortgage records, to ascertain if a notice of lis pendens 
has been filed.229  
The rights of a purchaser to acquire property free and clear of claims 
asserted in a lawsuit, if no notice of lis pendens has been filed, was 
recognized in one case,230 where the court explained: 
Inasmuch as the sale to the Majors was recorded in the public 
records of Catahoula Parish prior to the filing of plaintiffs’ suit 
and Notice of Lis Pendens, none of the matters alleged in 
plaintiffs’ petition could affect the Majors. They are third parties 
who have relied on the public records. No discussion of the well 
established principles enunciated in these cases is necessary.231 
For example, if a pending suit pertains to the title or ownership of, say, 
a mineral lease, which is covered by the PSA, consideration should be 
given as to whether the other party to the litigation could exercise the right 
to redeem the asset under the doctrine of the sale of litigious rights—i.e., 
rights that are “contested in a suit already filed.”232 Under Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2652:  
When a litigious right is assigned, the debtor may extinguish his 
obligation by paying to the assignee the price the assignee paid for 
the assignment, with interest from the time of the assignment. . . .  
                                                                                                             
 229. Regulations concerning a notice of lis pendens are found in the Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3751 (2003) (“The 
pendency of an action or proceeding in any court, state or federal, in this state 
affecting the title to, or asserting a mortgage or privilege on, immovable property 
does not constitute notice to a third person not a party thereto unless a notice of 
the pendency of the action or proceeding is made, and filed or recorded, as 
required by Article 3752.”); id. art. 3752 (Supp. 2015) (“A. The notice referred to 
in Article 3751 shall be in writing, signed by the plaintiff, defendant, or other 
party to the action or proceeding who desires to have the notice recorded, or by a 
counsel of record for such party showing the name of the persons against whom 
it is to be effective, the name of the court in which the action or proceeding has 
been filed, the title, docket number, date of filing, and object thereof, and the 
description of the property sought to be affected thereby. B. This notice shall be 
recorded in the mortgage office of the parish where the property to be affected is 
situated and has effect from the time of the filing for recordation. The notice shall 
cease to have effect after ten years from the date of its filing for recordation. 
Nevertheless, if the action or proceeding is still pending, the notice may be 
reinscribed by refiling the notice. A reinscription of the notice that is filed before 
the effect of recordation ceases continues that effect for five years from the day 
the notice is reinscribed.”). 
 230. Succession of Wilson v. Wilson, 446 So. 2d 526 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
 231. Id. at 529 (citations omitted). 
 232. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2652 (2015). 
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Nevertheless, the debtor may not thus extinguish his obligation 
when the assignment has been made to a co-owner of the assigned 
right, or to a possessor of the thing subject to the litigious right.233 
c. Contractual 
An assessment should be made as to the contracts in place for the 
administration or operation of the properties in order to understand future 
or potential cost liability. The purchaser would want to know if any 
contract would result in the future disruption or reduction of the seller’s 
right to receive proceeds of production. These issues arise in the event that 
there is a “payout” arrangement being tracked, or future gas balancing 
responsibilities in the event of a split-stream marketing arrangement.234  
The importance of determining the existence of any imbalance in gas 
production was demonstrated by the case of Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. Wapiti 
Energy, L.L.C.235 Petro-Hunt entered into an agreement to sell certain 
properties to Wapiti.236 In its PSA, Petro-Hunt represented to the purchaser 
that it had no knowledge of any production imbalance.237 The agreement 
further provided that the seller would deliver to purchaser a proposed final 
settlement statement within 60 days after closing.238 
After closing, but before the delivery of the final settlement statement, 
“Petro-Hunt became aware that its representation and warranty that there 
were no production imbalances in the relevant interests was not true.”239 It 
acknowledged this fact in the statement, which it delivered to the 
                                                                                                             
 233. Id. 
 234. “Payout” is the point in time at which the owners of the working interest 
in and to a well have recovered out of production attributable to their interests, the 
entirety of the costs and expenses incurred in the drilling, completion, equipping 
and operating of the well. At that point, it often occurs that a third party is entitled 
to receive an interest in production, such that the NRI of the working interest 
owners will be diminished accordingly. 
  A “split-stream marketing arrangement” is presented when working 
interest owners are marketing their share of production separate and apart from 
any other working interest owner. If a particular owner fails to market its share in 
a particular month, production imbalances occur, a matter discussed in the next 
case. 
 235. No. 01-10-01030-CV, 2012 WL 761144 (Tex. App. Mar. 8, 2012). 
 236. Id. at *1. 
 237. Id. The parties also agreed that “[a]ll representations and warranties set forth 
in this Agreement . . . shall survive for a period of twelve (12) months following 
Closing.” Id.  
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at *2. 
748 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
 
 
purchaser.240 The parties agreed that they did not have sufficient 
information to resolve this imbalance, and thus, that “[s]ettlement for the 
gas imbalances will be made as soon as the amounts are known and 
mechanics of settlement can be agreed upon by the Parties.”241 The parties 
settled on all other aspects of the transaction as covered by the final 
settlement.242 
Wapiti sought and obtained information from the operator, 
ExxonMobil, with respect to the gas imbalance, and informed Petro-Hunt 
that it was owed $349,730.243 Petro-Hunt responded that it “refused to pay 
Wapiti for the gas imbalance.”244 After filing suit, Wapiti obtained a 
summary judgment on liability.245 A trial was held to determine 
damages.246 The court awarded Wapiti $424,811.80 in actual damages and 
$318,113 in attorneys’ fees, plus additional fees for the defense of the 
judgment on appeal.247 
On appeal, Petro-Hunt argued that the parties’ purchase and sale 
agreement required the concurrence of the parties on the post-closing 
amounts: “Without such agreement, under the terms of the [PSA], the post-
closing amounts were not due. Petro-Hunt argued that no agreement was 
possible, because the amount of the imbalance, if any, was not known.”248 
The court rejected this point of error, finding that the evidence supported 
the existence of the imbalance.249 
Petro-Hunt next urged that “the trial court improperly calculated 
damages by valuing the entire imbalance as of the gas value on a single 
day.”250 The court rejected this argument, finding that the testimony was 
“legally sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the value 
of the production imbalance should have been based on the value of gas 
on the closing date.”251 
The purchaser must also identify any required consents to assign, or 
other restriction on the free assignability of any particular asset that is the 
subject of the PSA, specifically as it pertains to mineral leases. By the 
same token, the existence of any preferential right to purchase must be 
                                                                                                             
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at *1. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at *3. 
 248. Id. at *6. 
 249. Id. at *7. 
 250. Id. at *8. 
 251. Id. at *10. 
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identified and examined. If the seller is relying on agreements with 
landowners—other than the lessor under a mineral lease—for access to any 
well site, the seller should verify that all necessary contractual arrangements 
are in place, in force and effect, not subject to a pending termination, and do 
not contain unusual terms that would cause a disruption in production or 
access to the property. Contractual commitments in the form of future 
drilling obligations under a mineral lease, farm-in agreement, or proposal 
for the conduct of a subsequent operation under an operating agreement,252 
must be identified and quantified. 
This phase of due diligence—an examination of extant contractual 
arrangements—arguably overlaps with the conduct of title due diligence 
insofar as it is necessary to review the mineral leases held by the seller. The 
purpose of examining these critical contracts is to, first and foremost, verify 
that they have been maintained in force and effect, and, secondly, to identify 
any onerous or unusual terms. Particularly important is evaluating the 
possibility that the lease has been “divided” by virtue of a prior partial 
assignment, either vertical or horizontal—a consideration that is 
important, but is also beyond the scope of this paper.253 
d. Insurance 
The cost and coverage that liability insurance affords must be 
examined, particularly if these matters are required by either contract or 
regulatory requirement. 
D. Representations and Warranties 
The PSA customarily contains certain basic representations of stated 
fact and express warranties, provided both by the seller and the purchaser. 
From the viewpoint of the purchaser, the statement of such “reps and 
warranties,” while important and comforting, does not obviate the 
necessity to conduct due diligence into the matters discussed above. Many 
of the representations and warranties might be considered as mundane or 
routine, such as statements as to the due organization of each party; the 
authority of the person who serves as signatory for each party; that the 
execution of transaction documents will not violate any pertinent law or 
court order, or result in a default under any other agreement; and that the 
PSA, and other documents, are valid, binding and enforceable. The 
                                                                                                             
 252. See generally Patrick S. Ottinger, Be Careful What You Ask For: 
Subsequent Operations Under the Model Form Operating Agreement, 63 ANN. 
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. 281 (2012). 
 253. See Ottinger, What’s in a Name?, supra note 53. 
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agreement usually provides that such “reps and warranties” are valid and 
accurate when first stated, and will also be true at closing. 
1. Of the Seller 
Beyond the basic “reps and warranties” noted above, the seller might 
make specific statements as to certain matters and confirm that the matters 
reflected on identified schedules attached to the PSA are true and 
complete. Examples include the following: inclusion of schedules 
describing and identifying pending litigation; consents and approvals 
necessary to be obtained; preferential rights to purchase, which must be 
respected; that all royalties and other interests in production have been 
paid; and negating the fact that there are outstanding obligations—such as 
AFE’s, cash calls, or well proposals—in excess of a stated amount of 
money, for which purchaser will have responsibility.254 
2. Of the Purchaser  
The seller would expect the purchaser to make an explicit 
representation that no litigation is pending or threatened which would 
preclude the consummation of the transaction. Additionally, the seller 
would be vitally interested in knowing, by way of a representation on the 
part of the purchaser, that the latter has the funds to purchase the assets, or 
has arranged financing for that purpose.  
Particularly if the seller is unfamiliar with the purchaser, the seller 
should seek certain representations having as their purpose the 
disallowance of any opportunity on the part of the purchaser to rescind the 
sale of the leases as being unregistered securities. Representations of this 
type include assertions that the purchaser is purchasing the assets “for its 
own account, and not with the intent to make a distribution in violation of 
the Securities Act of 1933 as amended (and the rules and regulations 
                                                                                                             
 254. An “AFE” is an Authorization for Expenditure, a document issued by an 
operator to a non-operator in which an estimate of the costs to drill a well (or 
conduct some other activity) is set forth, and seeking the approval of the non-
operator to participate in the activity described therein, and to pay its share of the 
estimated costs. A “cash call” is a demand by the operator, pursuant to a provision 
in the operating agreement, for a non-operator to advance its share of costs 
anticipated to be incurred in the next calendar month. A “well proposal” is a 
proposal by a party (who may be a non-operator) to conduct some specified 
operation, and calling upon all other parties to express their concurrence and 
agreement to share in costs to be incurred in the operation. 
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pertaining thereto),” or words to that effect.255 Another example of 
representation would be that the purchaser is an experienced oil and gas 
operator who is “able to evaluate the merits and risks of an investment in 
the Properties,” and understands the risks associated therewith. Further, 
that the purchaser “has made its own independent investigation of the 
Properties to the extent necessary to evaluate the Properties,” could prove 
to be a useful warranty in that it demonstrates that the purchaser is not an 
innocent, unknowing, or unsophisticated business person.  
One party or the other will often resist a particular representation or 
warranty upon which the other party insists, unless that warranty is 
qualified by a “knowledge qualifier.” This may mean, for example, that a 
matter is stated “to the best knowledge of Seller,” which would mean the 
actual knowledge of the personnel of the seller. 
E. Covenants 
Covenant means “a promise of a particularly solemn nature, made in 
such a manner as to communicate its enduring character and the highest 
commitment that the promise will be fulfilled.”256 Thus, a covenant is a 
promise to do, or not do, something. When made in a PSA, the beneficiary 
of the covenant is entitled to rely upon the other party’s promise in entering 
the contractual relationship. 
The word “covenant” appears in only five articles of the Civil Code, 
none of which abide the understanding of the term as used in a purchase 
and sale agreement.257 Oil and gas lessees are also familiar with the term 
as used in reference to the so-called “implied covenants” of the lessee, but 
even the source article for these important rules is void of that term.258  
A covenant differs from a representation or warranty, on which the 
other party is also anticipated to rely, in that the covenant is usually more 
focused, perhaps less generalized, and is actionable to the extent that it 
constitutes an explicit undertaking, directed to a particular matter or 
interest. The PSA customarily contains covenants that precede the closing 
                                                                                                             
 255. See Jack D. Laird, The Sale of Fractional Interests in Oil, Gas and 
Mineral Rights—When are They Considered Securities?, 43 INST. ON OIL & GAS 
L. & TAX’N 6-1 (1992). 
 256. 1 THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 281 (Stephen 
Michael Sheppard ed., 2012). 
 257. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 102, 103, 3099, 3106, 3180 (2015). 
 258. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (2000) (“A mineral lessee is not under a 
fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good 
faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent 
operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate 
what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.”). 
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(“pre-closing covenants”), and those which endure after the closing occurs 
(“post-closing covenants”). 
1. Pre-Closing Covenants 
As a promise by one party to the other, a covenant typically would be 
stated as “Seller will” do something, or “Seller shall use its best efforts” 
to cause something to happen. Before closing, a common covenant by the 
seller would typically constitute a promise to the purchaser to permit the 
latter to have access to the seller’s books and records for purposes of the 
conduct of due diligence. Additionally, the seller may promise that the 
purchaser will have the right to inspect the properties, which affords an 
opportunity for the purchaser to evaluate the condition of the assets, verify 
their actual existence, and become satisfied as to the value assigned to such 
assets. 
Another “pre-closing covenant” running from the seller to the 
purchaser is to the effect that “Seller will continue the operation of the 
Properties in the ordinary course of its business (or, where Seller is not the 
operator of a Property, will continue its actions as a non-operator in the 
ordinary course of its business).” An important covenant that goes along 
with the duty to continue the operation of the properties is a covenant to 
maintain in place, before closing, insurance and any government bonds. In 
addition, because the seller is in the best position to do so, a typical 
covenant would obligate the seller to “use reasonable efforts, consistent 
with industry practices in transactions of this type, to identify, with respect 
to all Oil and Gas Properties, the names and addresses of parties holding 
the Preferential Rights or Consents identified on” a schedule or exhibit to 
the PSA. 
The important feature of the covenants that the seller puts forth to and 
for the benefit of the purchaser is to ensure that, before closing, the 
properties are maintained, administered, and operated in the same manner 
as they have historically been, so that at closing, the purchaser is acquiring 
the properties as they existed at the inception of the transaction to the 
extent practicable. 
2. Post-Closing Covenants 
The PSA might impose further obligations on the parties even after 
the transaction is consummated. Customary among these post-closing 
covenants are the following: the preparation and completion of any post-
closing adjustments; the payment of all sales taxes occasioned by the sale 
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of the interests, if any are due and payable;259 and all documentary, filing 
and recording fees required in connection with the filing and recording of 
any types of conveyances; taking all actions necessary to effectuate the 
transfer, including the filing of applications and notices with governmental 
agencies; the removal of all lease and well signs indicating seller’s 
ownership of the now-conveyed assets; and the delivery of all files and 
records to the purchaser. 
F. Termination Provisions 
A matter of equal importance to both the seller and the purchaser is an 
articulation of the circumstances under which a party may terminate the 
agreement, with no further liability to the other. These provisions are 
sometimes called “walkaways,” or “contractual outs.” A typical PSA sets 
forth the following events or occurrences that give rise to a right of 
termination by one party or the other: (a) a material, uncured breach by the 
other party; (b) by mutual consent of the parties; (c) if the transaction has 
not been closed by some stated date, despite the good faith exercise of 
diligence of the parties; (d) if a certain monetary threshold has been met, 
either in reference to a title defect or an environmental defect; or (e) if the 
transaction cannot be closed by reason of a legal impediment, such as an 
injunction or other statutory or regulatory impediment. 
Typically, if the agreement terminates pursuant to one of these 
circumstances, the parties will “walk away,” from each other. The PSA 
will address the disposition of any deposit posted by the purchaser but will 
not, however, release a party from liability for damages if its action or 
inaction was the cause of the termination. 
A party electing to terminate an agreement for the purchase and sale 
of property must attempt to comply with the terms of the agreement as 
they pertain to the manner in which termination is to be made effective. 
For example, in one case,260 the court held that notice of termination 
provided by e-mail was an insufficient dispatch of such notice, as the 
agreement required the termination to be “in writing.”261 The court 
rejected the argument that an electronic communication was authorized 
and effective under the Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,262 
                                                                                                             
 259. The transfer of assets in connection with a sale of producing oil and gas 
assets is excluded from sales taxation, as it constitutes the isolated or occasional 
sale of tangible personal property by a person not engaged in such business. See 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:301(1), :301(10)(c), :303(B)(4) (2007 & Supp. 2015). 
 260. White v. Strange, 80 So. 3d 1189 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 261. Id. at 1193. 
 262. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2601 to :2620 (2005 & Supp. 2015). 
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because that act only applies if the parties “agreed to conduct transactions 
by electronic means.”263 That did not occur in this case, because “the box 
that states ‘Seller authorized the authentication of his signature or of the 
Purchaser’s by facsimile (fax) or e-mail’ was left unchecked.”264 
If the PSA affords an opportunity for the purchaser to terminate the 
agreement based upon the articulated findings of any due diligence, the 
purchaser must comply with the requirements of such “contractual out.” 
For example, in one case265 in which the agreement allowed the purchaser 
to terminate the agreement following an inspection, the right of 
termination was provided under the following terms: 
Upon completion of Inspections, [purchaser] must provide [seller] 
with a copy of all inspection reports, and recognizes that such 
reports may be provided to others by [seller]. If [purchaser] is not 
satisfied with the present condition of the property as reflected in 
the Inspection reports, [purchaser] (1) may elect, in writing, to 
terminate the agreement to purchase . . . .266 
The purchaser, upon receipt of the inspection report, notified the seller of 
its election to terminate the agreement but did not provide a copy of the 
report to the seller as required.267 The court determined that “the trial 
court’s factual determination that [purchaser] breached the Agreement was 
not manifestly erroneous,” explaining as follows: 
According to the Agreement’s inspection provision, if [purchaser] 
was not satisfied with the condition of the property “as reflected 
in the inspection reports,” he had the authority to terminate the 
Agreement, as long as said report was provided to [seller]. The 
trial court found that the “report does not state that the elevation 
as reflected in the survey limits the purchaser’s use of the 
property.” Thus, because the flood elevation survey/report simply 
revealed the property’s elevation statistics, coupled with 
[purchaser] failing to provide a copy of the document to [seller], 
                                                                                                             
 263. 80 So. 3d at 1192; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2605B(1) (providing that the 
Act “applies only to transactions between parties, each of which has agreed to 
conduct transactions by electronic means”). 
 264. 80 So. 3d at 1193. 
 265. 1100 S. Jefferson Davis Parkway, LLC v. Williams, 165 So. 3d 1211 (La. 
Ct. App. 2015). 
 266. Id. at 1214. 
 267. Id. at 1216–17. 
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it cannot be considered an inspection report as contemplated by 
the Agreement.268 
G. Allocation of Liability and the Associated Indemnities 
In today’s environment, hardly any provision in a purchase and sale 
agreement is more important than the clause addressing allocation of 
liability and associated indemnities. One of the factors that might motivate 
a party to divest a producing property is the concern of future liability to 
plug and abandon wells, stemming from the potential of a “legacy lawsuit” 
filed in respect of allegations that the property has not been properly 
remediated.269  
The conflicting interests of the seller and purchaser are obvious. The 
seller will seek to pass along to the purchaser all responsibility for any and 
all actions then pending, or to be instituted in the future, that seek damages 
for the environmental condition of the property. The seller will likely want 
to spell out this allocation of liability in the clearest of terms. In dire 
contrast, the purchaser will seek to have the seller retain responsibility for 
all potential damages caused by activities occurring before the effective 
date. The purchaser has an equal interest in spelling out this allocation of 
liability in the clearest of terms. 
If the purchaser prevails in keeping the seller “on the hook” for pre-
effective date activities, the matter so identified will be characterized as a 
“retained obligation,” for which seller alone remains responsible. If the 
seller is successful in having the purchaser assume responsibility for pre-
effective date activities, the matter so identified will be characterized as an 
“assumed obligation.” Even if the purchaser assumes the obligation, 
however, the seller—as the assignor under the ultimate assignment—
remains responsible to the lessor.270 At the same time, the assignor may be 
                                                                                                             
 268. Id. at 1217. 
 269. “‘Legacy litigation’ refers to hundreds of cases filed by landowners 
seeking damages from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged 
environmental damage in the wake of this Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa 
Production, [850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003)]. These types of actions are known as 
‘legacy litigation’ because they often arise from operations conducted many 
decades ago, leaving an unwanted ‘legacy’ in the form of actual or alleged 
contamination.” Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.1 (La. 2010). 
 270. “An assignor or sublessor is not relieved of his obligations or liabilities 
under a mineral lease unless the lessor has discharged him expressly and in 
writing.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:129 (2000); see also Kleas v. Mayfield, 404 
So. 2d 500 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
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relieved of liability to the Office of Conservation if the parties undertake 
to establish a site-specific trust account.271  
Regardless of how these matters play out, the environmental due 
diligence conducted by the purchaser is of critical importance so that the 
purchaser and seller might be informed of the condition of the property, 
and the liabilities attached. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated: 
“The rule of indemnity is founded upon the general obligation to repair the 
damage caused by one’s fault and the moral maxim that ‘no one ought to 
enrich himself at the expense of another.’”272 
A “knock-for-knock” indemnity arrangement is one in which party A 
promises to indemnify party B from liabilities associated with party A’s 
activities—and those of its employees—and vice versa.273 In its simplest 
form, this arrangement is purely bilateral, but it is common to add, by way 
of definition, a reference to the representatives associated with each of the 
parties, such as “party A, its contractors, subcontractors and consultants, 
its directors, officers, employees and agents, and its parent, affiliated or 
subsidiary companies.” One court characterized a “knock-for-knock” 
indemnity agreement as one “whereby each party to the contract would 
indemnify the other for claims brought by its employees or the employees 
of subcontractors it hired.”274 
The important topic of indemnity is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, and is frequently litigated in the Bayou State’s oil patch.275 Critical 
to the negotiating and drafting of an indemnity clause is the basis for the 
undertaking. Is it based on commitments made by the parties, or purely on 
the fault of a party? Does it contain a temporal feature as to when the 
triggering event occurs? 
The preparation of an effective indemnity provision requires a thorough 
understanding of a variety of public policy considerations, many of which 
involve legal limitations on the construction of language purporting to 
require a party to indemnify another for the fault of that other, as well as 
issues of clarity, “talismanic” language, and conspicuousness.276 
                                                                                                             
 271. See supra Part IV.C.3.c. 
 272. Ebinger v. Venus Constr. Corp., 65 So. 3d 1279, 1283 (La. 2011). 
 273. See Weathersby v. Conoco Oil Co., 752 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 274. Id. 
 275. See, e.g., Noble Energy, Inc. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co., No. 09-
748, 2011 WL 6046623 (W.D. La. Dec. 5, 2011). 
 276. For excellent commentary on this important topic, see J. Jay Caraway, 
Allocation of Contract and Tort Liability for P&A, Site Restoration and Related 
Issues, 41 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 1 (1994), and Marilyn C. Maloney and John 
Almy, Indemnity Agreements in Mergers and Acquisitions, CENTER AM. & INT’L 
L., www.cailaw.org/institute-for-energy-law/onlineeducation/2014/mergers-and-
acquisitions.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2016). 
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H. The Closing 
The “closing” is the event that culminates the process that includes 
due diligence and other matters. This event is the time and place at which 
the transaction contemplated by the PSA is consummated. 
1. Consummation of Transaction  
At the closing, all relevant documents are signed and the purchaser 
pays the purchase price, which occur to effectuate the intention of the 
parties. The date, time, and place of the closing are set forth in the PSA 
but are often rescheduled or revised to accommodate due diligence, to 
make necessary calculations for purchase price adjustments, or to obtain 
necessary consents or waivers of “pref rights.”  
When all suspensive conditions—in the jargon of the common law, 
“conditions precedent”—to the closing have been satisfied or waived by 
the parties, the closing will take place. It certainly can be a face-to-face 
meeting, but it is often accomplished in different cities by signing and 
exchanging the relevant documents. Because most delays occur due to 
banking delays associated with the wire transfer of the purchase price, 
parties frequently “pre-close” the transaction the day before the actual 
closing date, with all executed documents being held in trust pending 
receipt by the seller of the purchase price.  
Parties should also remain aware that they can obligate themselves to 
fulfill the conditions necessary for the closing. In Ratcliff Development, 
L.L.C. v. Ollie Lee Corp.,277 the parties’ PSA set a closing date of October 
23, 2012, and further provided that the purchaser278 had an inspection 
period after which the purchaser could notify the seller of any title 
defects.279 Purchaser notified the seller, who then had a 90-day period of 
time to cure any defects at its expense.280 When the seller failed to do so, 
the purchaser sued for specific performance to enforce the contract.281 
The seller defended by arguing “that the closing date as set forth in the 
original contract of 23 October 2012 was the drop-dead date unless 
excluded by mutual agreement of the parties pursuant to paragraph 17 of 
the buy-sell agreement,” an argument that the court found “to be without 
merit.”282 
                                                                                                             
 277. 155 So. 3d 698 (La. Ct. App. 2015). 
 278. Id. at 704. 
 279. Id. at 702. 
 280. Id. at 703. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 704. 
758 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
 
 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of specific 
performance, stating, as follows: 
We therefore find that the trial court correctly interpreted the clear 
terms of the Purchase Agreement. Upon Ollie Lee’s failure to cure 
the title defect, Ratcliff had the option to seek specific 
performance, which required Ollie Lee to complete the act of sale 
under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. The trial court 
correctly found that the remedy of specific performance was 
appropriate based on the testimony and evidence presented at 
trial.283 
2. Preparation of Closing Documents  
Before the actual closing, the parties consult with each other and often 
prepare a closing checklist to assign responsibility to various parties for 
the preparation and delivery of documents to be executed or delivered at 
the closing. On some date before the closing, both the seller and the 
purchaser prepare and approve a preliminary settlement statement. This 
statement includes the several elements or components supporting the 
calculation of the preliminary purchase price. Typically, the purchaser is 
afforded a period of time before closing to review the statement and 
propose any adjustments based upon information developed in its due 
diligence to that point in time. If the parties agree to changes proposed by 
the purchaser, the preliminary purchase price is adjusted accordingly. If 
not, the parties might nevertheless use the purchase price proposed by the 
seller, knowing that further adjustments can be made at a future date after 
the closing. 
3. Typical Closing Documents  
An array of documents are typically executed at the closing. If the 
seller is the operator of the properties being sold, the parties execute a 
change-of-operator form to be filed with all applicable regulatory bodies. 
In Louisiana, this is an Amended Permit to Drill, changed to reflect the 
new operator.284 Parties also execute letters in lieu, simple letter form 
agreements, which are directed to the purchaser of production, informing 
it of the change in ownership—and thus the asset purchaser’s entitlement 
to proceeds of production—as of the effective date of the transaction. The 
letter usually ratifies any existing division order pertaining to the assets 
                                                                                                             
 283. Id. at 707–08. 
 284. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, §104A2 (2011). 
2016] CLOSING THE DEAL IN THE BAYOU STATE 759 
 
 
 
being sold,285 and also serves as the authority for the purchaser of 
production to commence payment of the proceeds of production to the 
purchaser of assets with respect to production obtained at and after the 
effective date to which the parties have agreed. Additionally, if the seller’s 
assets are subject to a mortgage or security agreement, the seller will 
deliver appropriate releases of those encumbrances so that the assets 
purchased are not burdened by those mortgages. 
The parties typically exchange evidence of the authority of each 
signatory to execute and deliver the closing documents. If the purchaser is 
obligated, by way of the PSA, to take over and assume any outstanding 
bonds, letters or credit, or other instruments of financial security or 
performance, the seller will be provided replacement instruments so that 
those instruments posted by seller will be released or cancelled. If, despite 
the exercise of diligence, a certain requirement contained in the PSA has 
not been achieved or satisfied by the date of the closing, parties might elect 
to execute a letter agreement that extends the date by which such closing 
condition must be accomplished, with a specified penalty for failure to 
accomplish it by such extended date. Finally, the Assignment is the most 
critical document to be executed, as reflects the change of ownership 
resulting from the consummation of the transaction.  
I. Post-Closing Adjustments 
The purchase price paid at the closing is that amount reflected by the 
preliminary settlement statement that might be adjusted at or before 
closing based upon actual information available to the parties. At some 
date after the closing—often as much as 90 or 180 days later—the seller 
typically tenders to the purchaser a proposed final settlement statement, 
which reflects changes necessary to “true up” the estimates contained in 
the preliminary settlement statement, and reflects actual transactions that 
contribute to either an increase or decrease in the purchase price.286 This 
is called a “purchase price adjustment.” 
                                                                                                             
 285. A “division order” is an “instrument setting forth the proportional 
ownership in oil or gas, or the value thereof, which division order is prepared after 
examination of title and which is executed by the owners of the production or 
other persons having authority to act on behalf of the owners thereof.” LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 31:138.1 (2000). 
 286. In the industry, to “true-up” is to refine the estimated number by taking 
into consideration actual transactions so as to make current and accurate the value 
at issue. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 737 
F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that the 
parties’ course of performance indicates that they consistently made adjustments 
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The transactions that contribute to an adjustment of the purchase price 
might relate to the resolution of any title or environmental defect that was 
not concluded before closing. Additionally, revenue and expenses, both 
pre-closing and post-closing, are taken into consideration so as to reflect 
actual, rather than merely estimated, amounts. Matters that are accounted 
for by way of an adjustment to the purchase price customarily do not come 
within the ambit of an indemnity owed by one party or the other because 
the party has already received credit, or suffered a debit, with respect to 
such matters. 
J. Miscellaneous Provisions 
The range of contractual stipulations that one might encounter in a 
PSA is determined by the prior experience of the parties and is unlimited 
in terms of the doctrine of “freedom of contract” enjoyed by such parties. 
1. “Freedom of Contract”287 
The doctrine of “freedom of contract” operates in connection with the 
agreements associated with the purchase and sale of producing properties, 
particularly the PSA, to allow parties to construct their own bargains by 
including clauses specially crafted to accomplish their intentions. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court describes the doctrine thus: “‘Freedom of 
contract’ signifies that parties to an agreement have the right and power to 
construct their own bargains. . . . In a free enterprise system, parties are 
free to contract except for those instances where the government places 
restrictions for reasons of public policy.”288 These statements are 
necessary corollaries of the idea enunciated in Louisiana Civil Code article 
1983, which informs that “[c]ontracts have the effect of law for the 
parties.”289 At the same time, contracting parties are assured that they “are 
free to contract for any object that is lawful, possible, and determined or 
determinable.”290 
Setting forth all of the unique or important clauses commonly 
encountered in PSAs would be impossible. Indeed, the generous use of the 
                                                                                                             
to the amount of payment due at a time after the contract payment date, to ‘true-
up’ the actual Quality Bank adjustments from the estimated amounts.”). 
 287. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of OTTINGER, supra note 
12, ch. 2, pt. I. 
 288. La. Smoked Prods., Inc. v. Savoie’s Sausage & Food Prods., Inc., 696 So. 
2d 1373, 1380–81 (La. 1997). 
 289. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2015). 
 290. Id. art. 1971. 
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words typically or customarily, as set forth herein, should be understood 
in the context of the doctrine of “freedom of contract,” which might, in a 
proper case, operate to alter—or even exclude—the given clause. Even so, 
mention of a few of the “typical” or “customary” provisions is warranted. 
2. Material Adverse Effect Clause  
An important clause often encountered in a PSA is the “Material 
Adverse Effect Clause.” A clause of this type is an attempt by the parties 
to anticipate extreme changes in circumstance that might permit a party to 
withdraw from the contract or propose and effectuate a revision to the 
terms of the PSA. 
An example of such a provision might read, as follows: 
“Material Adverse Effect” means any circumstance, change, 
effect, condition, development, event or occurrence that has 
resulted in, or would be reasonably likely to result in, a material 
adverse effect on the value of the Assets, taken as a whole; 
provided, however, none of the following circumstances, changes, 
effects, conditions, developments, events or occurrences shall be 
deemed to constitute, or shall be taken into account in determining 
whether, a Material Adverse Effect has occurred or would be 
reasonably likely to occur: (a) any changes in Hydrocarbon or 
other commodity prices, or in general conditions in the industries 
or markets in which Seller operates; (b) changes, events, effects, 
or developments generally applicable to the oil and gas industry 
in the State of Louisiana, or to the oil and gas industry as a whole; 
(c) national or international political conditions, including any 
engagement in hostilities, whether or not pursuant to the 
declaration of a national emergency or war, or the occurrence of 
any military, terrorist, or criminal attack; (d) changes in Law, 
GAAP,291 or the interpretation thereof from and after the 
                                                                                                             
 291. “GAAP” is the acronym for “Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles;” it is often a defined term in a PSA, and might be stated as:  
Generally accepted accounting principles, applied on a consistent basis, as 
set forth in Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and/or in statements of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board and/or their respective successors 
and which are applicable in the circumstances as of the date in question. 
Accounting principles are applied on a “consistent basis” when the 
accounting principles observed in a current period are comparable in all 
material respects to those accounting principles applied in a preceding 
period. 
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Execution Date; (e) the announcement or pendency of this 
Agreement, actions contemplated by this Agreement or the other 
Transaction Documents, or the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby or thereby; (f) matters that will be reflected as 
a downward adjustment in the determination of the Adjusted 
Purchase Price as of the Closing Date; (g) changes or developments 
in financial or securities markets, or the economy in general, 
including any changes in currency exchanges rates, interest rates, 
monetary policy, or inflation; (h) effects of weather, meteorological 
events, natural disasters, or other acts of God; (i) actions or inaction 
of Governmental Authorities; (j) any decrease in the market price 
of any Party’s (or such Party’s parent’s) publicly traded equity 
securities; (k) the downgrade in the rating of any debt or debt 
securities of any Party (or such Party’s parent); (l) the effects of any 
action or inaction by Seller or any Affiliate of Seller at the request 
or direction of Purchaser; provided that actions or inactions taken 
(or omitted to be taken, as applicable) with Purchaser’s consent 
shall not be considered to be taken (or omitted to be taken, as 
applicable) at the request or direction of Purchaser; (m) natural 
declines in well performance or the results of Hydrocarbon reserves 
or production from any Well; or (n) any matters set forth or 
described in the Disclosure Schedules on the Execution Date, or 
that Purchaser has knowledge prior to the Execution Date. 
A more abbreviated example of such a clause might read: “There shall 
occur no adverse material change to the Properties or Seller’s interest 
therein from the date of this letter to Closing.” The meaning of this precise 
provision was litigated in Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Templeton Energy 
Income Corp.292 After signing a letter agreement containing this clause 
designated in the agreement as condition 4(c), Templeton, as purchaser, 
refused to consummate the transaction, noting the recent drop in the price 
of oil “had, in its opinion, ‘adversely affected’ the Properties and that 
Templeton did not consider it ‘feasible’ to negotiate a definitive purchase 
and sale agreement as required by the letter agreement.”293 The court 
rejected this contention, and explained: 
Nothing in the letter agreement itself hints of any other con-
struction. Nor does the plain meaning of the words lead to absurd 
consequences. The essential purpose of the price agreement was 
to fix the value at which the trade would later be finalized. If 
                                                                                                             
 292. 889 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 293. Id. at 623. 
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increases or decreases in market value were to govern, the price 
term would have been redundant. Therefore, Templeton’s attempt 
to pour new content into the language of condition 4(c) in an effort 
to avoid what market fluctuations caused to be an economically 
unwise business decision is unavailing. We conclude that condition 
precedent 4(c) was fulfilled.294 
The lesson to be learned from Templeton is that the words selected by 
the parties matter, and if the parties intended to allow the purchaser to 
escape from its commitment to purchase, in the event of significant 
changes in commodity prices, such intention should be explicitly set forth 
in the “Material Adverse Effect Clause.” 
3. Choice of Law 
Finding that the parties have stipulated that the law of a state other 
than Louisiana controls the relationship created by the PSA is not 
uncommon. Parties frequently chose Texas law to control, particularly 
where both parties are domiciled in Texas. Louisiana law states that 
contracts in one state may be made with reference to the laws of another 
state, so long as the law chosen has a significant relationship to the contract 
or the parties.295 One court elaborated: 
Traditionally, Louisiana courts have found that parties to a 
contract may agree to have their contract controlled by the law of 
a state other than their own, provided the terms of the contract are 
not against the public policy of the state in which the contract is 
to be performed.296 
In Whitehurst v. James Noel Flying Services,297 the court stated as 
follows: 
It is well established that where the parties stipulate the state law 
governing the contract, Louisiana conflict of laws principles 
require that the stipulation be given effect, unless there is statutory 
or jurisprudential law to the contrary or strong public policy 
considerations justifying the refusal to honor the contract as 
                                                                                                             
 294. Id. at 624. 
 295. Davis v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 283 So. 2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1973); 
Wellcraft Marine, Inc. v. Dauterive, 482 So. 2d 1002 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
 296. Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., Inc. v. Moreno, 643 So. 2d 327, 330 (La. Ct. 
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written. A choice of law provision in a contract is presumed valid 
until it is proved invalid. The party seeking to prove such a 
provision is invalid bears the burden of proof.298 
The prerogative for the parties to invoke the law of a state other than 
Louisiana—in which the mineral leases are located—to control their 
relationship, is governed by the Civil Code. As a general rule, “an issue in 
a case having contacts with other states is governed by the law of the state 
whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not 
applied to that issue.”299 Courts are directed to evaluate two factors when 
determining which state’s law should govern under this general rule:  
(1) the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and 
(2) the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems, 
including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of 
parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might 
follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.300 
Thus, the enforceability of the parties’ choice of governing law from 
a state other than the Bayou State is determined on a mixture of facts and 
policy considerations. The principal limitation on the application of the 
law of a foreign state is that regimes of property law from the selected state 
that are antagonistic or repugnant to Louisiana’s civil law tradition, will 
not generally be enforced, while matters which are more procedural in 
nature might be tolerated. 
                                                                                                             
 298. Id. at 1037 (citations omitted); see also Cont’l Eagle Corp. v. Tanner & 
Co. Ginning, 663 So. 2d 205 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Lewis v. Townsend, 108 So. 3d 
184 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 299. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2015). For conventional obligations specifically, 
there are additional enumerated factors to consider:  
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the 
relevant policies of the involved states in the light of: (1) the pertinent 
contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction, including the 
place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the 
location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile, habitual 
residence, or business of the parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of 
the contract; and (3) the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as 
the policies of facilitating the orderly planning of transactions, of 
promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and of protecting one 
party from undue imposition by the other. 
Id. art. 3537; see also id. art. 3540 (“All other issues of conventional obligations 
are governed by the law expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by the parties, 
except to the extent that law contravenes the public policy of the state whose law 
would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537.”). 
 300. Id. art. 3515. 
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In some cases, Louisiana law will govern the contract regardless of the 
weighing of these factors or the intent of the parties. One exception to the 
general rule applies to contracts involving real rights in immovables that are 
located in Louisiana: “Real rights in immovables situated in this state are 
governed by the law of this state. Real rights in immovables situated in 
another state are governed by the law that would be applied by the courts of 
that state.”301 Consequently, a PSA covering mineral leases corresponding 
to land in Louisiana is governed by Louisiana law. 
4. Forum Selection Clauses 
A “forum selection clause” is a provision stipulating that any litigation 
between the parties to a PSA must be filed and prosecuted in an identified 
court in a stipulated parish or county. Some have expressed doubt as to the 
validity of such clauses, as Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 
44(A) clearly and unambiguously prohibits waiver of the Code’s venue 
provisions in advance of the litigation.302 The appellate courts in Louisiana 
have been inconsistent in the treatment of such clauses.303 
In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,304 the United States Supreme 
Court stated that “such clauses are prima facie valid and should be 
enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 
‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”305 
The Louisiana Supreme Court resolved the same issue in one case,306 
declaring as follows: 
Based on our review of the law, we find no reason for Louisiana 
to deviate from the general rule set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court that contractual forum selection clauses are prima 
facie valid. We hold that such clauses should be enforced in 
Louisiana unless the resisting party can “clearly show that 
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause 
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching . . . [or that] 
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum 
                                                                                                             
 301. Id. art. 3535 (“Whether a thing is an immovable is determined according 
to the substantive law of the state in which the thing is situated.”). 
 302. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 44(A) (2015). 
 303. Compare Thompson Tree & Spraying Serv., Inc. v White Spunner 
Constr., Inc., 68 So. 3d 1142 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011), with Rising Res. Control, 
Inc. v. KIE Commodities & Fin., L.L.C., 80 So. 3d 1217 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2011). 
 304. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 305. Id. at 10. 
 306. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. of La., 148 So. 3d 
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in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial 
decision.” This court has long recognized that the freedom to 
contract is an important public policy.307 
If the parties have incorporated an arbitration clause into their PSA, 
however, this clause is ineffectual—except perhaps in relation to a suit to 
confirm or vacate an award. In other words, an agreement to arbitration 
would be enforced, rendering immaterial a conflicting selection of a forum 
to resolve disputes through traditional litigation.308 
V. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
Parties to a PSA must prepare for the possibility that the other party 
may fail to perform its respective obligations under the contract. As a 
bilateral contract,309 a PSA is susceptible of being breached by either party. 
On the one hand, the seller might fail or refuse to complete the transaction 
by refusing to close and execute the assignment. On the other hand, the 
purchaser might wish to “walk away” from the transaction, refusing to pay 
the purchase price. In any case, the law provides an array of remedies to 
the party who seeks to either enforce the contract to sell or recover 
damages resulting from the breach by the other party.310 
A. Specific Performance 
Specific performance is the remedy that would most fundamentally 
place the parties in the position in which they anticipated to find themselves 
had the parties fully performed. This remedy most perfectly achieves the 
bargain sought by the parties, as embodied in their agreement.  
Under Louisiana law, the general rule is that a party is entitled to the 
remedy of specific performance.311 This idea is reflected in Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2623, which provides: “[A contract to sell] gives either party 
the right to demand specific performance.”312 Likewise, Louisiana Civil 
                                                                                                             
 307. Id. at 881 (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13). 
 308. See Univ. of La. Monroe Facilities, Inc., v. JPI Apartment Dev., L.P., 151 
So. 3d 126, 132 (La. Ct. App. 2014), writ denied 158 So. 3d 818, 820 (La. 2015) 
(“Louisiana law favors arbitration as a preferred method of alternative dispute 
resolution.”). 
 309. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1908 (2015) (“A contract is bilateral . . . when the 
parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the obligation of each party is 
correlative to the obligation of the other.”). 
 310. See id. arts. 1989–2011 (providing for remedies for the breach of 
conventional obligations generally). 
 311. Rutherford v. Impson, 366 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. Ct. App. 1978). 
 312. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2623. 
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Code article 1986, provides more generally: “Upon an obligor’s failure to 
perform an obligation to deliver a thing . . . or to execute an instrument, 
the court shall grant specific performance plus damages for delay if the 
oblige so demands.”313  
Despite the general rule that parties are entitled to the remedy of specific 
performance, the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear that a court has 
discretion to deny such a remedy when doing so would be impracticable.314 
Relying on this authority, Louisiana courts have limited the use of specific 
performance in the context of a PSA under certain circumstances. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court described the rationale behind the 
limitations to the remedy of specific performance in the case of Lombardo 
v. Deshotel,315 in which the court noted: 
Above all others, the creditor enjoys the right to demand, insofar 
as is practicable, the specific performance of the obligation. Here, 
however, the distinction between obligations to do or not to do is 
of great moment, since an obligation to give a thing is always 
susceptible of forced execution—unless, of course, performance 
has become impossible or impracticable—while this is not always 
the case with an obligation to do, or one not to do, where the liberal 
principle of modern law that prevents laying hands on a person to 
force him physically to do something is always taken into 
account.316 
Thus, if “specific performance is impracticable or . . . the obligation the 
obligor has failed to perform is an obligation to do,” a court may decide to 
not grant specific performance, limiting the obligee’s remedy to 
compensatory damages.317 In addition, in the context of a “take-or-pay” 
case,318 a Louisiana court gave a more detailed account of potential 
limitations on the obligee’s ability to demand specific performance: “An 
obligee has a right to specific performance for breach of contract except 
when it is impossible, greatly disproportionate in cost to the actual 
                                                                                                             
 313. Id. art. 1986 (emphasis added). 
 314. Id. 
 315. 647 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1994). 
 316. Id. at 1090 (citations omitted).  
 317. Id. at 1091 (citing as examples Louisiana Civil Code article 1986 cmt. b, 
c (1984) and J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 404 So. 2d 896 (La. 
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 318. Pogo Producing Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 493 So. 2d 909, 919 (La. 
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damages caused, no longer in the creditor’s interest, or of substantial 
negative effect upon the interest of third parties.”319 
If a court finds that such limitations do not apply, the general rule will 
govern and the aggrieved party will have a right to demand specific 
performance. In such a case, the court will direct the breaching party to 
perform a specific act and, in the case that party fails to comply, the court 
“may direct the act to be done by the sheriff or some other person 
appointed by the court, at the cost of the disobedient party, and with the 
same effect as if done by the party.”320 However, it is important to note 
that, if the act involves merely the transfer of ownership of an immovable, 
the judgment is self-operative and thus the court will not need to direct a 
third person to perform any set task.321 
Closely associated with the remedy of specific performance is 
Louisiana Civil Code article 1988, which provides that a “failure to 
perform an obligation to execute an instrument gives the obligee the right 
to a judgment that shall stand for the act.”322 Thus, a party to a PSA who 
refuses to abide by a judgment of specific performance cannot, by its 
disobedience, defeat the consummation of the transaction. Rather, the 
obligee has the “right to a judgment that shall stand for the act.”323 
Consequently, in Kinberger v Drouet,324 the court explained: “If the 
plaintiff has the right to the title, it will be so decreed, and defendant . . . 
will be condemned to sign the deed. If she refuses to sign, then the decree 
will be the title.”325 
A recent suit involving a failed purchase and sale transaction of 
producing oil and gas properties in Louisiana provides insight into the 
workings of a PSA and the remedy of specific performance. In J. B. Hanks 
Co., Inc. v. Shore Oil Co.,326 the parties entered into a PSA for the transfer 
of certain producing assets in Livingston Parish from Shore to Hanks.327 
The parties entered into a confidentiality agreement, and then negotiated 
and executed a PSA.328 The PSA provided for a closing to occur on 
                                                                                                             
 319. Id. at 919. 
 320. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2504 (2015). 
 321. Id. cmt. b. 
 322. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1988 (2015). 
 323. Id. 
 324. 90 So. 367 (La. 1922). 
 325. Id. at 372. 
 326. No. 97-00040-BAJ-SCR, 2014 WL 268689 (M.D. La. Jan. 23, 2014). As 
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 328. Id. at *2. 
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September 9, 1994.329 The Purchase Price for all of the assets was 
originally set at $450,000.330 
After conducting due diligence, the purchaser asserted, as a title 
defect, the fact that the seller had not properly accounted to a particular 
lessor for royalties in accordance with the terms of a mineral lease. The 
seller disagreed that this constituted a “material defect[] in title, percentage 
interest, or deficiency in the Documents discovered by Purchaser,”331 and 
litigation ensued. 
The court—in adopting the Report and Recommendation of the 
Special Master—deemed “most important,” the fact that continued receipt 
by the lessors under the relevant lease of royalties as calculated by Shore, 
“viewed in the worst light . . . would probably result in the assessment of 
monetary damages rather than dissolution of the Lease.”332 Dissolution of 
a mineral lease for improper payment of royalties—assuming it was 
improper—is a disfavored remedy.333  
The court held that the assertion by the purchaser with respect to the 
manner of payment of royalties under this lease did not meet the standards 
of the PSA as constituting a “defect in title.”334 The court concluded that, 
“in the absence of the timely assertion of a valid ‘defect in title,’ the PSA 
confers options only upon the Seller, not the Purchaser.”335 The court 
finally found that the purchaser had waived any defects not asserted: 
Having not asserted, on or before the stipulated date (September 
27, 1994), a valid “defect in title,” the Purchaser waived all defects 
not asserted. At that point, the Purchaser was obligated to appear 
at the Closing on the Closing Date and conclude the transaction 
contemplated by the PSA. By failing to do so, the [court] 
determines that Shore had no further obligation to convey the 
Assets to the Purchaser.336 
The case of Whitbeck v. Champagne337 involved an action seeking 
specific performance to require a purchaser to consummate the transaction 
                                                                                                             
 329. Id.  
 330. Id. at *19. The Purchase Price was later reduced to $437,500.00, when a 
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 331. Id. at *3–5. 
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contemplated by a PSA affecting residential properties.338 The agreement 
afforded the purchaser an inspection period of 15 days to make all 
inspections of the property.339 The purchaser availed itself of this right of 
inspection but did not raise any concerns within the 15-day period.340 By 
virtue of not raising any objections to the condition of the property, the 
purchaser waived the right to complain about the condition.341  
The parties set a closing date, but the purchaser informed the seller on 
the morning of the closing that it would not close the transaction because 
of information received from a third party that the home had a “mold and 
mildew issue.”342 The seller, although not obligated to do so contractually, 
gave the purchaser a further opportunity to “take whatever steps they 
deemed necessary to satisfy themselves that the Big Lake home was free 
of mold and mildew.”343 After the purchaser persisted in refusing to close 
the transaction, the seller filed suit for specific performance.344 After 
discovery was completed, the seller filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which the court granted.345 The trial court said:  
The Champagnes were given carte blanche to inspect the house by 
the Whitbecks, who asserted all through this process that they had 
nothing to hide. The Champagnes were free to take any measures 
necessary to assure there were no mold or structural defect present 
in the Big Lake house, including tearing out the sheetrock in the 
bedroom in question, as recommended by their realtor. The 
Champagnes failed to do so.346 
The judgment of specific performance was affirmed on appeal, and 
additional attorney’s fees were awarded to the sellers.347  
In another recent case,348 the purchaser was entitled to specific 
performance of the PSA, because inaction on the part of the seller to cure 
the title to the property did not constitute the seller’s “reasonable inability 
to deliver merchantable title within the time specified.”349 Specifically, the 
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purchaser was entitled to specific performance, because the seller failed to 
comply with the terms of the PSA by failing to complete the monition 
process and cure the title defect, after which the seller was entitled to 
pursue the fulfillment of the agreement through a demand for specific 
performance.350  
B. Money Damages 
Although specific performance is the preferred remedy for a breach of 
a PSA, that remedy might not be available if, for example, the seller has 
sold the property to a third person who is protected by the “public records 
doctrine.”351 In such a case, the remedy of the purchaser might be one of 
money damages.  
1. Duty to Mitigate352 
Although it is a defensive doctrine usually presented in a tort action, a 
plaintiff is clearly obliged to exercise reasonable efforts to mitigate 
damages where possible.353 The duty to mitigate originated judicially as a 
“natural consequence of the principle stated in C.C. Art. 1903 (1870).”354 
That duty is now codified in Louisiana Civil Code article 2002, which 
provides, as follows: “An obligee must make reasonable efforts to mitigate 
the damage caused by the obligor’s failure to perform. When an obligee 
fails to make these efforts, the obligor may demand that the damages be 
accordingly reduced.”355 
This article adjusts the conflict of interests that would otherwise exist 
when an obligee neglects to mitigate his damages and thereby exposes the 
obligor to further liability for consequences of the obligor’s failure to 
perform that were reasonably avoidable by the obligee. The purpose of the 
codally imposed obligation of the obligee to take reasonable steps to 
minimize its damages, has been explained by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court,356 as follows: 
The doctrine of mitigation of damages applies in this state. This 
doctrine imposes on the injured person a duty to exercise 
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reasonable diligence and ordinary care in attempting to minimize 
his damages after the injury has been inflicted. The care and 
diligence required of him is the same as that which would be used 
by a man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances. He need 
not make extraordinary efforts or do what is unreasonable or 
impractical in his efforts to minimize the damages, but his efforts 
to minimize them must be reasonable and in accordance with the 
rules of common sense, good faith and fair dealing.357 
2. Stipulated Damages  
A stipulated damages clause—or a “penal clause”—is “designed to both 
fix the damages caused by nonperformance of the principal obligation and 
act as a constraint to encourage performance of that obligation.”358 Courts 
have consistently held that “a stipulated damage clause fixes the amount of 
all damages that may be recovered, and actual damages may not be 
awarded.”359 Louisiana Civil Code article 2005, provides, as follows: 
“Parties may stipulate the damages to be recovered in case of 
nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance of an 
obligation. That stipulation gives rise to a secondary obligation for the 
purpose of enforcing the principal one.”360 
In Utley-James of Louisiana, Inc. v. State, Division of Administration,361 
the court described the stipulated damages clause, as follows: “Under 
Louisiana law, a stipulated damages clause is designed to fix the measure of 
damages in advance and to constrain the timely performance of the principal 
obligation. No showing of pecuniary or other actual damage is required to 
enforce the clause.”362 Another court has further explained: “Stipulated 
damages may be modified by the court if they are so manifestly 
unreasonable as to be contrary to public policy. Stipulated damages should 
reasonably approximate the damages suffered by the obligee and not be 
penal.”363 
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C. Attorney’s Fees 
The well-established rule in Louisiana is that one may not recover 
attorney’s fees from a defendant, unless these fees are authorized by 
contract or statute.364 A court has explained that “[a]n award of attorney 
fees is a type of penalty imposed not to make the injured party whole, but 
rather to discourage a particular activity on the part of the opposing 
party.”365 Thus, for a party to recover attorney’s fees incurred as a 
consequence of the breach of the other party to a PSA, that agreement must 
include a contractual basis for the award of such fees. 
D. Prescription 
In Louisiana, the concept of “statute of limitations” is known as 
liberative prescription. Article 3447 of the Louisiana Civil Code states that 
“[l]iberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of 
inaction for a period of time.”366 “The fundamental purpose of a 
prescription statute is to afford security of mind to a defendant and protect 
against a stale claim,”367 as well as “to afford a defendant economic and 
psychological security if a cause of action is not pleaded timely, and to 
protect the defendant from stale claims and the loss of relevant proof.”368 
Louisiana jurisprudence is well settled that the “character the plaintiff has 
given his action by his pleadings must govern us in determining the 
prescription applicable to it.”369 Thus, depending on the nature of the claim 
brought by a party to a PSA, the relevant prescriptive period is, generally 
speaking, either five years or ten years. 
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1. Applicable Prescriptive Period 
Before 2006, the prescriptive period to enforce a PSA, or assert a 
breach thereunder, was ten years.370 In 2006, Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 9:5645 was enacted,371 which now provides a five-year 
prescriptive period: “An action for the breach or other failure to perform a 
contract for the sale, exchange, or other transfer of an immovable is 
prescribed in five years.”372 
2. Unreasonable Delay in Seeking Relief 
Even though a period of five years exists to file a suit in respect of a 
“breach or other failure to perform” a PSA,373 this does not mean that a 
timely filed suit cannot be subject to dismissal on the merits, based upon 
the dilatory conduct of one party. The courts have held that one who seeks 
specific performance of an agreement to sell must institute his suit within 
a reasonable time and before any material change affecting the interest of 
the parties has taken place.374 
For example, in Joffrion v. Gumbel,375 the Louisiana Supreme Court 
summarized the general rules underlying specific performance of a 
contract to sell land and stated the “well-recognized rule” as follows: 
The general rule is that he who seeks performance of a contract 
for the conveyance of land must show himself ready, desirous, 
prompt, and eager to perform the contract on his part. Therefore 
unreasonable delay in doing these acts which are to be done by 
him will justify and require a denial of relief. No rule respecting 
the length of delay which will be fatal to relief can be laid down, 
for each case must depend on its peculiar circumstances.376 
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The case of Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace Co.377 involved a dispute sur-
rounding a bond for deed contract.378 The parties’ agreement stated that 
the purchaser would be permitted to buy three lots for a sum of $1,800, to 
be paid by an initial payment of $50 in cash, and 117 promissory notes for 
the balance, payable monthly, on or before the first day of each month.379 
The plaintiff alleged that he attempted to tender the total amount due by 
him at the time on the deferred payments under the contract, and the 
defendant refused to accept the tender and deliver to the plaintiff a deed.380 
The court concluded that the plaintiff violated his bond for deed 
contract with the defendant by failing to pay the monthly installment notes, 
deeming the attempted tender made by the plaintiff both too late and 
insufficient.381 More significantly, the court noted that the plaintiff refused 
to make payments and persisted in the cancellation of his contract 
acceptance, up until the date of his attempted tender, at which time the 
value of the lots had increased.382 The court stated that the “[p]laintiff 
cannot be permitted to play the role of ‘watchful waiting’ all of these years, 
without performing his obligation, and to reap, at this late date, the benefit 
of it in speculative values.”383 The court then quoted Joffrion to buttress 
its holding.384 
In yet another case,385 the plaintiff tendered a written offer to purchase 
land to be held open for a limited duration.386 The offer included an offer 
to purchase the land, “with ‘tools, stock, seed and feed’, and as ‘a walk out 
proposition’, for the cash price of $5,000.”387 The offer stipulated that, if 
the defendant’s title were found invalid or so defective that it could not be 
validated within a reasonable time and at a reasonable expense, then the 
contract would be null and void.388 The offer further stated that, if the 
contract was accepted, the plaintiff would be required to pay the remaining 
balance by a specified date, or it would be forfeited.389 
The plaintiff in Goudeau v. Daigle filed an action over eight years 
after the specific date upon which payment was due to “make good” on 
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the offer.390 The court held that the plaintiff plainly abandoned the contract 
which he sought to revive.391 More significantly, the court articulated the 
perceived unfairness that would result from a decision in the plaintiff’s 
favor.392 The court stated: 
Plaintiff can not fairly be permitted to press the claim that he now 
seeks to urge against the present defendants. The continued 
development of the Charenton oil field, which was brought in on 
September 6, 1936—after LeBlanc’s death—suggests that the 
[new] value now attaching to “the property of Mr. Paul LeBlanc, 
East side Charenton” (as the offer to buy reads) in the mind of the 
plaintiff (who alleges himself to now be a citizen of the State of 
Texas) is probably a value entirely disassociated from that which 
led him to make his “walk-out” offer to purchase, in 1931.393 
This jurisprudentially recognized limitation on the right to sue for 
specific performance is uniquely appropriate to the sale of producing oil 
and gas properties, due to the speculative nature of such assets.394 As one 
court noted: 
The business of the exploration of minerals is highly speculative 
and capital intensive. It involves the investment of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, and the activity is extremely price sensitive. 
Economic fluctuations can turn a lucrative investment one month 
into a financial fiasco the next.395 
The court in Schluter referred disapprovingly to the practice of “watchful 
waiting,” suggesting that courts will not tolerate a party “waiting” and 
“watching” as the value of the assets increases, only then seeking to enforce 
                                                                                                             
 390. Id. at 845. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id.  
 394. Louisiana jurisprudence is replete with cases that acknowledge the 
speculative nature of oil and gas activities, often resulting in a refusal to award 
damages based upon “mere conjecture and speculation.” See, e.g., McCoy v. Ark. 
Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632 (La. 1936); Ferguson v. Britt, 185 So. 287 (La. 
1938); Ludeau v. Cont’l Oil Co., 78 So. 2d 170 (La. 1955); Aladdin Oil Co., v. 
Rayburn Well Serv., Inc., 202 So. 2d 477 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Veazey v. W. T. 
Burton Indus., Inc., 407 So. 2d 59 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Coon v. Placid Oil Co., 
493 So. 2d 1236 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
 395. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. State Mineral Bd., 615 So. 2d 1051, 1056 
(La. Ct. App. 1993). 
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its rights.396 In the “oil patch,” both in the Bayou State and elsewhere, this 
practice is called “laying behind the log,”397 and is widely viewed with 
considerable disdain. 
E. Arbitration of Disputes 
Many agreements for the purchase and sale of oil and gas properties 
contain a clause requiring the arbitration of any dispute arising out of the 
agreement. Finding a provision involving a tiered approach to alternative 
dispute resolution is not uncommon. Such a provision requires first, face-
to-face negotiations between higher-level officers of each party. If that is 
not fruitful, the agreement might then require mediation of the dispute. If 
that does not resolve the issue, a mechanism is provided that arbitration 
will resolve the dispute. 
In particular, the PSA customarily provides for arbitration of disputes 
arising out of the conduct of due diligence—particularly disputes as to 
whether a title or environmental defect asserted by the purchaser is in fact 
a defect meeting the definition of the agreement—or to ascertain the 
appropriate adjustment to the purchase price. Similarly, if the parties 
cannot agree on a proposed purchase price adjustment, a CPA with 
experience in these matters might be designated to resolve the dispute. 
Indeed, a PSA typically identifies the party who will be designated to 
arbitrate or resolve the dispute, sometimes by name, but often merely by 
qualification or scope of experience. To designate a “title arbitrator” or 
“defect referee,” a clause such as the following might be used: 
Any dispute shall be referred to a title attorney or other consultant 
experienced in the examination of title to properties of a similar 
character located in the state where the Assets are located 
mutually agreed upon by Purchaser and Seller for prompt 
resolution (the “Defect Referee”). The Defect Referee must have 
at least 10 years’ experience and must not have worked as an 
                                                                                                             
 396. Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace Co., 114 So. 586, 588 (La. 1927). 
 397. Conduct typically called “laying behind the log” is viewed with 
significant disdain in the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., J-O’B Operating Co. v. 
Newmont Oil Co., 560 So. 2d 852, 860 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding, in an AMI 
case, that a contrary ruling “would result” in an “obvious inequity,” the court 
noted that “the AMI parties who agreed to bear the acquisition cost of the Texaco 
sublease . . . shouldered the entire burden of the seismic program and thereafter 
the risk of drilling the [Well], at a cost in excess of ten million dollars. Appellees 
who bore neither the expense nor the risk of the venture now seek to participate 
in the proceeds from a highly successful well.”). In the interest of full disclosure, 
this Author represented a defendant in this suit. 
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employee or outside counsel for either Party or its Affiliates 
during the 5-year period preceding the arbitration or have any 
financial interest in the dispute. 
In like manner, disputes as to the existence or appropriate remedial 
action with respect to an environmental defect asserted by the purchaser 
may be referred to environmental consultants or engineers, as the parties 
might agree. 
As a general proposition, the use of alternate dispute resolution is 
preferred to litigation for a variety of reasons. First, the trier of fact is, by 
definition, a person trained or experienced in the matter in dispute. In 
contrast, the experience of a judge, competent as he or she might be, likely 
does not include the technical aspects of title, environmental, or financial 
matters presented in connection with producing oil and gas properties. 
This is particularly important as the parties might have a continuing 
relationship after the consummation of the transaction. Additionally, at 
least in theory, the resolution can be achieved very promptly and less 
expensively as compared to traditional civil litigation.398 
If the parties so agree, the proceedings can be conducted in privacy. 
The parties are free to contractually provide for the confidentiality of the 
proceedings and all documents or exhibits filed in connection with those 
proceedings. There is no reference in the arbitration statute of either 
Louisiana399 or Texas400 to any requirement of privacy or confidentiality. 
Texas statutory law does, however, contain a general requirement of 
confidentiality of matters involved or presented in an “alternative dispute 
resolution procedure.”401 
Although fundamentally a matter to be determined by the contract of 
the disputants, arbitrators are often required to take an oath that invokes 
the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. This Code was 
prepared in 1977 by a joint committee consisting of a special committee 
of the American Arbitration Association and a special committee of the 
                                                                                                             
 398. “The traditional advantages given for arbitration over litigation are that 
arbitration generally proceeds faster, is less costly and allows for a more 
expeditious disposition of the case.” JAMES S. HOLLIDAY, JR., H. BRUCE SHREVES 
& DALE R. BARINGER, LOUISIANA CONSTRUCTION LAW § 14:5 (West, Westlaw 
2015). 
 399. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201 to :4217 (2009). 
 400. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001 to 171.098 (West Supp. 
2014). 
 401. Id. § 154.073. 
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American Bar Association.402 Both organizations have approved and 
recommended this Code.403 Canon VI of that Code provides that “an 
arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration 
proceedings and decision.” 
Finally, the decision of the competent arbitrator chosen by the parties 
will be final, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. To the extent 
that a party to traditional civil litigation feels relegated to inflexibly 
following the rules prescribed by law, by the Code of Civil Procedure, by 
local court rules, and by custom and practices in a civil court, with all of 
the inconvenience, expense, and discomfort inherent, that same party has 
the right to exercise “freedom of contract,” and construct a flexible, 
reasonable, meaningful, inexpensive, non-intrusive, confidential, and just 
regime to resolve a dispute. Thus, if a client does not want its company 
hauled into an unfriendly forum; subjected to numerous, expensive, time-
consuming, limitless depositions; giving up its computers or records to 
forensic examination; and potentially submitting its economic future to a 
decision by a trier of fact who does not know a “Pugh Clause” from Santa 
Claus, that client might consider including a tailored arbitration clause in 
its contract.404 
A recent case represents the intersection between purchase price 
adjustments, in the sale of producing oil and gas properties, and the 
resolution by arbitration.405 Chesapeake and BP entered into a PSA, in 
which Chesapeake obligated itself to sell, and BP obligated itself to 
purchase, certain oil and gas properties in Oklahoma for $1.75 billion.406 
As is typical, the PSA allowed for adjustments to the purchase price based 
upon title defects or title benefits discovered by the parties before 
closing.407 Title defects would decrease the purchase price in favor of the 
purchaser, and title benefits would increase the purchase price in favor of 
the seller.408 More or less, claimed adjustments would not result in a 
                                                                                                             
 402. The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/AD 
RSTG_003867 (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 403. Id. 
 404. For the importance and effectiveness of this ADR method in the context 
of oil and gas contracts, see William Pitts, ADR in the Oil and Gas Context, 46 
ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW 157 (1999). 
 405. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, 747 F.3d 1253 (10th 
Cir. 2014). 
 406. Id. at 1255. 
 407. Id. at 1256. 
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modification of the purchase price unless they exceeded a threshold of $35 
million.409  
After closing, the parties agreed on title defects in the amount of 
$116,234,556.410 The PSA had an arbitration provision relative to disputed 
title defects and disputed title benefits.411 The parties submitted these 
matters to arbitration in which BP sought approximately $46 million for 
disputed title defects, and Chesapeake sought approximately $22 million 
for disputed title benefits and other “credits.”412 During the arbitration 
proceeding, BP submitted to Chesapeake a proposed final accounting 
statement reflecting agreed title defects of approximately $80 million.413 
Chesapeake responded with an exception report reducing the $80 million 
to $58 million, a reduction of $22 million, which represented the title 
benefits claimed by Chesapeake.414 
The panel awarded $11.5 million to BP in title defects, and $3.7 
million to Chesapeake in title benefits.415 In its award, “the panel noted 
that it made no determination of whether these amounts exceeded the 
aggregate threshold, or whether its ruling would actually cause any money 
to exchange hands.”416 Chesapeake disputed the panel’s jurisdiction after 
the entry of the first award.417 After further awards were entered, 
Chesapeake filed a complaint in Oklahoma state court seeking to confirm 
and modify the panel’s initial award, and to vacate the panel’s subsequent 
award.418 The suit was removed to federal district court, and after due 
proceedings, the court affirmed the panel’s awards.419 The case is more 
interesting on the issues pertaining to arbitration, jurisdiction, and the 
review of an arbitration award, than with respect to issues pertaining to 
purchase price adjustments.  
The cases noted above demonstrate the array of issues that might arise 
in the purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties, particularly 
against the background of market conditions that might change drastically 
from the date on which the PSA was executed through the date of closing. 
As circumstances might change for a variety of reasons—pricing of 
commodities, conditions of producing wells, title defects discovered 
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during the due diligence period, etc.—the parties turn first to the terms of 
the PSA to determine if closing can be delayed, enforced, or avoided 
depending on the perspective of the party who considers itself adversely 
affected by the condition. 
CONCLUSION 
Each PSA is unique to the transaction represented and its form and 
structure is usually dictated by the preference and experience of the party 
who generates the first draft. Typically, that party is the seller. Self-
evidently, although the peculiarities of the transaction dictate the content 
of the agreement, most forms of PSA tend to have similar types of 
provisions that are pertinent to the assets being conveyed and purchased. 
Similarly, the organization of the contract of sale, although it might 
vary in specifics, will tend to address similar matters. As a consequence, 
examining the general structure of a PSA as is typically encountered is 
appropriate. Thus, the Appendix sets forth the titles of the particular 
sections that might be encountered in a PSA. Although lacking in greater 
specificity, the mere listing of topics might be of benefit to the lawyer 
constructing a contract of sale for the disposition of producing oil and gas 
properties. 
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APPENDIX 
As mentioned above, a detailed, section-by-section analysis of a 
customary PSA would not be a fruitful exercise because the doctrine of 
“freedom of contract” suggests that “one size does not fit all.” Further, the 
commercial requirements and expectations of parties vary so greatly. For 
this reason, the words typically and customarily are so generously used in 
this Article. Despite the accuracy of these words, an identification of the 
types of clauses or provisions that typically appear in PSAs for larger 
transactions would be helpful and beneficial to at least prompt a party to 
give consideration to issues that might be addressed in that type of 
contract. For these reasons, the following list sets forth the types of clauses 
or provisions that are often encountered in a transaction of this type. 
Clearly, the main consideration in constructing an agreement is driven by 
the nature of the assets, the condition of the property, the relative 
sophistication and bargaining power of the parties, and the needs and 
abilities of each party with respect to future liability. 
 
• Preface 
 
• Definitions and References 
✓ Defined Terms 
 
• Property to be Sold and Purchased 
✓ Properties 
✓ Excluded Properties 
 
• Purchase Price 
✓ Purchase Price 
✓ Deposit 
 
• Representations of Seller 
✓ Organization and Qualification 
✓ Due Authorization 
✓ Approvals 
✓ Valid, Binding, and Enforceable 
✓ Litigation 
✓ Basic Documents 
✓ Consents and Preferential Rights 
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✓ Royalties, etc. 
✓ Outstanding Obligations 
 
• Representations of Purchaser 
✓ Organization and Qualification 
✓ Due Authorization 
✓ Approvals 
✓ Valid, Binding and Enforceable 
✓ No Litigation 
✓ No Distribution 
✓ Knowledge and Experience 
✓ Opportunity to Verify Information 
✓ Merits and Risks of an Investment in the Properties 
✓ Financing 
 
• Certain Covenants 
✓ Access to Records 
✓ Physical Inspection 
✓ Exculpation and Indemnification 
✓ Interim Operation 
✓ Preferential Rights and Consents 
✓ Insurance 
✓ Governmental Bonds 
✓ Financial Assurances 
✓ Notifications 
✓ Employment 
 
• Due Diligence Review 
✓ Review By Purchaser 
✓ Nature of Defects 
✓ NRI or WI Variances 
✓ Liens 
✓ Consents 
✓ Environmental Matters 
✓ Permitted Matters and Encumbrances 
✓ Seller’s Response to Asserted Defects 
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✓ Cure 
✓ Postpone Closing 
✓ Adjustment 
✓ Resolution of Uncured Defects 
✓ Agree Upon Adjustments 
✓ Other Remedies 
✓ Adjustment For Certain Uncured Defects 
✓ NRI Variance/Proportionate Price Reductions 
✓ Liens/Payoff Amount 
 
• Dispute Resolution 
✓ Possible Upward Adjustments 
✓ Defect Dispute Resolution 
✓ Limitations on Adjustments 
 
• Conditions Precedent to Closing Obligations 
✓ Conditions Precedent to Closing Obligations of Purchaser 
✓ Representations True and Correct 
✓ Compliance with Covenants and Agreements 
✓ Price Adjustment Limitations 
✓ Litigation 
✓ Conditions Precedent to Closing Obligations of Seller 
✓ Representations True and Correct 
✓ Compliance with Covenants and Agreements 
✓ Price Adjustment Limitations 
✓ Litigation 
 
• Closing 
✓ Closing 
✓ Seller’s Closing Obligations 
✓ Delivery of Conveyance 
✓ Federal and State Conveyance Forms 
✓ Letters in Lieu 
✓ Turn Over Possession 
✓ Transition Agreement 
✓ Other Agreements 
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✓ Purchaser’s Closing Obligations 
✓ Payment to Seller 
✓ Conveyance, etc. 
✓ Transition Agreement 
✓ Succession by Purchaser 
✓ Other Agreements 
✓ Post Closing Actions 
✓ Transfer of Files 
✓ Operational Transition 
✓ Notifications by Purchaser 
 
• Accounting Adjustments 
✓ Adjustments for Revenues and Expenses 
✓ Initial Adjustment at Closing 
✓ Adjustment Post Closing 
✓ No Additional Adjustments 
✓ Imbalance Adjustments 
 
• Assumption and Indemnification 
✓ Assumption and Indemnification By Purchaser 
✓ Indemnification By Seller 
✓ Limitation on Seller’s Indemnity Obligations 
✓ Survival of Provisions 
✓ Notice of Claim 
✓ Cooperation by Purchaser 
 
• No Commissions Owed 
 
• Casualty Losses 
✓ Casualty Loss 
✓ Notices 
 
• Notices 
 
• Miscellaneous Matters 
✓ Further Assurances 
✓ Gas Imbalances, Make-Up Obligations 
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✓ Waiver of Consumer Rights 
✓ Parties Bear Own Expenses/No Special Damages 
✓ No Sales Taxes 
✓ Entire Agreement 
✓ Amendments, Waivers 
✓ Choice of Law, etc. 
✓ Time of Essence 
✓ No Assignment 
✓ Successors and Assigns 
✓ No Press Releases 
✓ Counterpart Execution, Fax Execution 
✓ Exclusive Remedy 
✓ Imputed Knowledge and Waiver 
✓ References, Titles, and Construction 
✓ Severability 
✓ Seller’s Obligations Several Not Joint 
✓ Like Kind Exchange 
 
